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This Article investigates a question that has preoccupied corporate law 
scholarship for nearly seventy-five years: Do the merits matter in stockholder 
litigation? We exploit variation in the remedies available to stockholders at 
merger to show that classic stockholder litigation seems driven largely by 
factors unrelated to legal merit. Merger litigation offers an especially apt 
setting to study this question because of two unique features. First, in merger 
litigation, the merits of the legal claims are uniquely easy to perceive. Prior 
work has relied on proxies for litigation merit—the presence of an accounting 
restatement, a parallel SEC inquiry, and so forth. A merger, however, is an 
end-period transaction, and the only issue of genuine consequence to a typical 
stockholder will be the adequacy of the merger consideration. The second 
unique advantage of studying mergers is that stockholders have two distinct 
types of legal remedies available to them—filing a class action alleging 
fiduciary breach or seeking stockholder appraisal. The fiduciary class action 
shares the same basic structure as other forms of stockholder litigation like 
federal securities suits and derivative claims: a class comprised of all 
shareholders, lead plaintiffs with small holdings, and plaintiffs’ attorneys with 
control of the claims. Appraisal litigation, by contrast, has none of these 
features. If the fiduciary class actions differ from appraisal in the incidence 
and intensity of litigation, we can thus conclude that the difference is 
attributable to the difference in structure.  
We analyzed over 1,000 mergers from 2004 through 2013, investigating what 
factors are associated with fiduciary class actions and with appraisal filings. 
Fiduciary duty class actions challenging mergers are strongly associated with 
deal size, a variable that has far greater explanatory power than the merger 
premium. Our findings suggest that the merits count for little in the decision to 
bring a fiduciary suit and that such suits are brought for their nuisance value. 
By contrast, appraisal claims appear strongly related to legal merit. We argue 
that this difference demonstrates that litigation structure has a marked effect 
on the merits of claims. We also sketch out some preliminary reforms designed 
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to restructure conventional stockholder litigation in ways that will reduce 
meritless claims and improve the incentive to prosecute strong claims. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, scholars and policymakers have debated whether the legal 
merits of claims matter in stockholder litigation. The answer matters because 
stockholder litigation is the chief enforcement mechanism for the substantive 
rules of corporate and securities law.  
Early salvoes in this debate suggested that the merits matter surprisingly 
little in determining whether a claim will be brought and how it will be 
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resolved.1 Subsequent studies have led to more equivocal results, suggesting 
that at least in some situations there is a relationship between the merits and 
outcomes.2 These studies of the merits of shareholder litigation, however, all 
suffer from a common weakness: the difficulty of assessing the “merits” of 
complex claims in a world where stockholder suits almost never proceed to 
actual trial.3 Investigators have been forced to use highly imperfect proxies for 
merit, given the impossibility of directly assessing the merits of claims alleging 
fraud or breach of fiduciary duty and involving fact-sensitive questions like, for 
example, the defendants’ state of mind. As a result, conclusive results have thus 
far been elusive. 
We surmount this problem of assessing the merits of shareholder litigation 
by examining shareholder class actions that challenge proposed takeovers, the 
dominant form of shareholder suit today.4 Merger claims offer two major 
advantages in asking whether the merits matter. First, we can directly observe 
the paramount merits issue of claims attacking proposed takeovers instead of 
relying on some proxy for merit.5 Takeover transactions are end-period 
transactions, and the shareholders of the target firm typically receive the merger 
consideration and thereafter have no ongoing relationship with the enterprise. 
While shareholder actions challenging a proposed transaction are often couched 
                                                                                                                       
1 See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 500 (1991); Roberta Romano, The 
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 61 (1991).  
2 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1465, 1486–99 (2004); James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions 
Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 502 (1997). For an excellent summary of the large body of 
empirical work on this question, see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff 
Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1587, 1592–93 (2006); see also Quinn Curtis & John Morley, An Empirical Study of 
Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Litigation: Do the Merits Matter?, 30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 275, 
280 (2014) (“[T]here appears to be a growing consensus that the relationship [between 
merits and outcomes in class actions and derivative litigation] is reasonably strong.”).  
3 To get some indication of the infrequency with which shareholder litigation results in 
trial, consider that of the approximately 4000 federal securities class actions filed in the past 
twenty years, only about twenty (0.5%) have gone to trial. See RENZO COMOLLI ET AL., NERA 
ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2012 FULL-
YEAR REVIEW 38–39 (2013), available at http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/ 
publications/archive2/PUB_Year_End_Trends_2012_1113.pdf. 
4 A series of papers by Matthew Cain and Steven Davidoff has documented the 
increasing frequency of merger litigation. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, 
Takeover Litigation in 2012, at 1–2 (Feb. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2216727 (finding that almost 92% of all transactions with a value 
greater than $100 million experienced litigation in 2012); see also Robert B. Thompson & 
Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class 
Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 135 (2004) (reporting that “acquisition-oriented suits are 
now the dominant form of corporate litigation and outnumber derivative suits by a wide 
margin”). 
5 See infra Part II. 
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in terms of violations of fiduciary duty, the only issue of genuine consequence 
to a typical shareholder will be the adequacy of the merger consideration. We 
can thus examine directly the role of this important metric of merit in takeover 
litigation. 
The second major advantage of studying mergers is the availability of 
stockholder appraisal, a parallel remedy for challenging the merger 
consideration against which fiduciary class actions can be contrasted.6 The 
structure of an appraisal claim—the composition of the plaintiff class, the role 
of the attorney, and the fee-shifting rules—is radically different from that of 
fiduciary class actions, and we exploit this difference to test whether the 
structure of the litigation affects the merits of the claims.  
In a fiduciary class action, the claims by default proceed on behalf of the 
entire shareholder class. All of the major species of shareholder litigation—not 
just fiduciary class actions but also derivative suits and federal securities 
claims—are brought in a representative capacity, initiated and managed by 
professional plaintiffs’ attorneys.7 The actual named plaintiff is typically an 
unimportant player in the litigation, exercising little oversight over the 
prosecution or settlement of the claims. Many scholars have identified this 
relationship between the shareholders, on whose behalf the claims are brought, 
and the plaintiffs’ attorneys who control those claims as the root problem in 
shareholder litigation.8 The risk is that plaintiffs’ attorneys may not be perfectly 
faithful agents for shareholders, and they may bring claims that are not in the 
best interests of shareholders. It can also lead plaintiffs’ attorneys to forego 
aggressive litigation of meritorious actions in favor of a quick settlement that 
provides generous attorneys’ fees.9 Stockholders themselves face powerful 
                                                                                                                       
6 See infra Part III.B. The appraisal remedy gives a dissenting stockholder the option 
of refusing the consideration offered in a merger and instead receiving a cash payment for 
their shares at a judicially-determined fair value. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2013). 
Other states provide an appraisal remedy for a wider array of corporate actions, but 
Delaware—which will be the focus of this Article—restricts appraisal actions to mergers. 
See, e.g., 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 (2013). 
7 See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 598 (2007). 
8 See infra Part II. 
9 Delaware courts, for example, have complained about the profusion of “disclosure 
only” settlements in merger cases, in which the defendants agree to pay significant fees to 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys, while simply agreeing to provide additional disclosure to 
shareholders. See, e.g., Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference at 19, Scully v. 
Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010) (referring to 
disclosure only settlements as “cheap settlement”). A working paper by Matthew D. Cain 
and Steven M. Davidoff examines mergers in 2010 with a deal size greater than $100 million 
and finds that approximately 77% of claims that were not dismissed outright resulted in so-
called “disclosure only” settlements and that the mean fees provided to plaintiffs’ attorneys 
in such settlement was approximately $749,000. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A 
Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation 37 (Jan. 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984758. Another 14% resulted in largely 
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collective action problems in monitoring such settlements. The enduring 
question is whether this relationship attenuates the connection between the 
merits and litigation.10
The structure of appraisal claims offers a stark contrast to other forms of 
stockholder litigation. Each stockholder must affirmatively opt-in to the 
appraisal claim by meeting certain procedural requirements. As a result, an 
attorney representing a small stockholder cannot bring an appraisal claim in the 
hopes of gaining representative status for a larger class and, accordingly, a 
larger potential recovery. The shareholders must hire the attorneys, not the other 
way around. In addition, Delaware’s appraisal statute makes no provision for 
allocating the plaintiff’s attorney fees to the defendant.11 The result of this 
unusual feature is that, absent extraordinary circumstances, each side must bear 
its own attorneys’ fees.12 Consequently, if plaintiffs’ attorneys are to receive 
payment, it can only come from the plaintiffs, either directly or out of a genuine 
monetary recovery. This should serve to align the incentives of the attorney 
with those of the plaintiff shareholders.  
If the pathologies associated with standard stockholder litigation are 
caused—or at least exacerbated—by the ability of plaintiffs’ attorneys to secure 
large fees even in the absence of genuinely valuable recovery to the shareholder 
                                                                                                                       
cosmetic changes to the merger agreement, with no increase in consideration. Id. Mean fees 
provided to plaintiffs’ attorneys for such settlements were approximately $1,761,000. Id.
10 For influential discussions of the problematic incentives involved, see Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 437 (1988); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of Lawyer as 
Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 218 (1983); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action 
Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 533 (1997); D. Rosenberg 
& S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 3, 3 (1985). This problem persists in spite of various federal and state reforms have 
attempted to address this problem by prioritizing certain shareholders and attorneys in 
disputes for lead plaintiff. Most prominently, in 1995, Congress overrode a presidential veto 
to pass the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Among other things, the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) improved the ability of large shareholders 
to be appointed lead plaintiff in shareholder actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
Empirical investigations of these reforms report mixed results. See infra Part II.A. 
Delaware’s lead plaintiff rules are attentive to the named plaintiff’s holdings but also to 
other factors. These reforms fail to change the basic nature of the relationship between the 
attorney and the client in shareholder litigation. 
11 See Mary Siegel, An Appraisal of the Model Business Corporation Act’s Appraisal 
Rights Provisions, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 241 (2011). Siegel notes that the 
Delaware “statute’s only reference to expenses allows the court discretion to allocate a 
shareholder’s expenses among all shares entitled to appraisal.” Id.
12 The Delaware courts have crafted a “narrow” equitable exception to the default rule 
that both parties bear their own legal expenses where one side acts in bad faith, but this 
exception is rarely applied. See id. As is discussed infra note 191, virtually every appraisal 
action settlement approved by the Delaware courts provided that each party would bear its 
own costs. 
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plaintiffs, we would expect to see these pathologies significantly reduced in the 
appraisal context. In addition to a much-reduced agency problem, an appraisal 
proceeding presents the shareholder with a genuine risk of financial loss that is 
absent from other shareholder litigation. The shareholder must forego the 
merger consideration in order to pursue appraisal, and the court in an appraisal 
proceeding can ultimately determine fair value to be less than what the 
shareholder would have received.13 Unlike plaintiffs in fiduciary class actions, 
appraisal petitioners have real skin in the game, and we hypothesize that this too 
might focus their attention on legal merit. Taken together, these features mean 
that Delaware appraisal actions present a unique type of shareholder claim 
where the merits ought to matter a great deal.14 Because a crucial merits issue is 
the same in takeover litigation and in appraisal—the adequacy of the merger 
consideration—we can use appraisal as a benchmark against which to measure 
the merits of takeover litigation. 
Until now, such a comparison has not been possible, due to a lack of data 
on the characteristics of appraisal litigation. The prior lack of interest in 
appraisal stems, no doubt, from the longstanding conventional wisdom that the 
shareholder appraisal action is largely a dead letter, of little or no use to 
shareholders,15 and of no practical significance in modern mergers.16 As one 
                                                                                                                       
13 See infra Part III. 
14 See infra Part V. 
15 E.g., Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Delaware’s Going-Private Dilemma: Fostering 
Protections for Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration, 58 
BUS. LAW. 519, 546 (2003) (“[I]n practice, the appraisal remedy is replete with shortcomings 
and therefore fails to protect adequately minority shareholders from majoritarian abuse.”); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law 
Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359, 
412 (1996) (“Standing alone, the appraisal remedy cannot begin to assure the receipt of 
proportionate value.”); Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist 
Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 1005 (2006) (“The shortcomings of the 
appraisal remedy are widely known. Commentators have long recognized that appraisal is a 
remedy that few shareholders will seek under any circumstance.”); Joel Seligman, 
Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 830 (1984) (arguing that 
appraisal suffers from “substantial defects in the ability of state corporate law to ensure 
dissenting shareholders the fair value of their shares”); Guhan Subramanian, Fixing 
Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 31 (2005) (“[I]t is well accepted among academic 
commentators and practitioners that appraisal is a weak remedy compared to entire fairness 
review.”); see also JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS 601 (1997) (“[T]he risk of 
considerable expense as well as the procedural difficulties in pursuing the [appraisal] remedy 
further decrease its effectiveness in protecting minority shareholders.”); 2 AM. LAW INST.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 4, intro. 
note (1994) (“The practical utility of the appraisal remedy as a protection for minority 
shareholders has been the subject of much debate, and few legal commentators have been 
confident that the remedy works sufficiently well to play a major role in corporate 
governance.”). 
16 See Paul G. Mahoney & Mark Weinstein, The Appraisal Remedy and Merger 
Premiums, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 239, 242 (1999). 
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Delaware opinion noted, appraisal is “chock-full of disadvantages for 
shareholders.”17 In a companion paper, we present a full empirical picture of 
contemporary appraisal activity and argue that prior commentators have 
underestimated the social utility of appraisal.18 Here, we use the differing 
structures of appraisal and fiduciary class actions as a natural experiment to 
investigate the role of legal merit in conventional shareholder litigation.  
We identified all appraisal-eligible merger transactions involving a 
Delaware-incorporated target for the ten-year period from the beginning of 
2004 through the end of 2013. We limit our study to appraisal-eligible 
transactions so we can compare the selection of mergers for legal challenge via 
fiduciary duty class action against the selection for appraisal petition.19 This 
ensures as close to an apples-to-apples comparison as possible, where 
differences in litigation patterns cannot be explained by differences in the 
underlying universe of transactions. We examined each transaction to determine 
whether a fiduciary class action was filed challenging the merger, whether an 
appraisal petition was filed, or whether both types of claims were brought. 
To determine whether the merits matter, we compare the characteristics of 
mergers that resulted in fiduciary duty class actions to the larger universe of 
mergers. The size of the merger premium should be correlated to the magnitude 
of the potential damages and also to the probability of a breach of fiduciary 
duty. If the merits matter, we would expect to observe an inverse relationship 
between the size of the merger premium and the likelihood of a fiduciary class 
action challenging the merger. That is, shareholders should be more willing to 
challenge the merger when they are set to receive a small premium over the 
market value of their shares, and less likely to do so when they would receive a 
large premium.  
We also examine the relationship between the overall size of the deal and 
the likelihood of a fiduciary duty class action. While the size of the deal is 
generally correlated to the potential damages available, the deal size should 
be—at most—approximately as relevant to the merits as the size of the merger 
premium. If, however, the incidence of class action litigation is driven by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys searching for deep pockets, we would expect a far stronger 
positive relationship between deal size and the likelihood of a claim.20
                                                                                                                       
17 Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 547 (Del. Ch. 2000).  
18 See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of 
Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424935. 
19 As discussed more fully infra Part III, the appraisal remedy is only available for a 
subset of all merger transactions. 
20 Davidoff and Cain, for example, have found that in recent years a large percentage of 
all mergers with a deal size greater than $100 million have resulted in some form of 
shareholder litigation. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 2 (finding that 92% of all 
transactions with a value greater than $100 million experienced litigation in 2012). 
Similarly, Curtis and Morley find that mutual fund family size is the single greatest predictor 
of excessive fee litigation—greater even than the size of the fees being challenged as 
excessive. See Curtis & Morley, supra note 2, at 275.  
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Consistent with this expectation, we find that fiduciary duty class actions 
challenging mergers are strongly associated with deal size and that deal size has 
far greater explanatory power than the merger premium. Our findings suggest 
that the merits count for little in the decision to bring suit and that such actions 
are frequently brought primarily for their nuisance value.21
To test this conclusion, we also examine the incidence of appraisal actions. 
We have assembled a hand-collected data set of every appraisal action filed in 
Delaware for the ten-year study period.22 We find that appraisal activity—
unlike fiduciary litigation—is not correlated with deal size at all. This finding 
supports the conclusion that the usual correlation between deal size and 
shareholder litigation is driven by agency problems and asymmetric litigation 
risks that are largely absent in the appraisal context. We also examine the 
merger premium for deals that attracted an appraisal petition versus those that 
did not.23 Again, in contrast to the results for fiduciary duty class actions, we 
find that there is a strong correlation between the merger premium and the 
likelihood of an appraisal claim. Mergers with smaller premia are more likely to 
attract appraisal actions, precisely as we would expect if the decision to seek 
appraisal is based on the merits of the underlying claim. 
In sum, our findings show that the merits matter in the incidence and 
intensity of appraisal actions, and we find no evidence that such actions are 
being driven by an attempt to capture nuisance value. This stands in stark 
contrast to the fiduciary class action litigation, where deal size is the strongest 
predictor of litigation, with far greater influence than the size of the merger 
premium. These results represent the most conclusive evidence yet that the 
merits matter little in at least one important class of stockholder litigation. The 
contrasting example of appraisal litigation involving the same universe of 
transactions makes the conclusion all the more compelling.  
We offer some possible avenues for improving stockholder suits, though a 
detailed program of reform is beyond the scope of this Article. Our results 
support the idea that the well-known pathologies of stockholder litigation are, in 
fact, driven by its structural features.24 Thus, the chief reform objective should 
be to alter the structure of shareholder litigation—in particular, to ensure that 
the plaintiff in control of filing and releasing the claims has a meaningful 
economic stake in those claims. One of our preliminary ideas about reform is 
altering the criteria for selecting the lead plaintiff to favor stock acquired after 
the announcement of a merger or—more drastically—switching to an opt-in 
class. Such reforms would lead to higher-quality claims with stronger 
deterrence value. 
                                                                                                                       
21 See infra Part IV. 
22 We located cases by searching for the Delaware Chancery Court dockets for the term 
“appraisal,” both on Westlaw and on Bloomberg, and evaluated the results for relevance. 
23 See infra Part V.C. 
24 See infra Part IV.D. 
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part II introduces the debate over the 
merits of shareholder litigation and demonstrates the problem of finding a 
suitable proxy for merit. Part III describes the fiduciary class actions and 
appraisal petitions, explaining how they allow us to conduct a more direct 
investigation of the merits. Part IV presents the results of the empirical 
investigation of the merits of fiduciary class action claims, revealing that it is 
driven chiefly by factors unrelated to merit. In Part V, we present the 
companion analysis of appraisal litigation, where we find that litigation activity 
is strongly correlated with merit. Part VI explores the implications of our results 
and offers some tentative recommendations for reform. A brief conclusion 
follows. 
II. THE DEBATE OVER THE MERITS OF SHAREHOLDER SUITS
It has long been recognized that the structure of shareholder litigation lends 
itself to abuse. In particular, plaintiffs’ attorneys may file lawsuits and settle 
them with little regard for the legal merits of the underlying claims. Legal 
commentators have dedicated enormous attention to this contentious issue, 
analyzing the incentives that bear on the various parties involved in shareholder 
suits and assessing the merits of the claims that are ultimately brought. The 
debate has even, on occasion, spilled over into the larger political arena, as it 
did during the disputes surrounding the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA), which was ultimately passed when Congress overrode President 
Clinton’s veto in 1995.25 Definitive conclusions, however, have been 
surprisingly elusive, in part due to the extreme difficulty of determining—or 
often even defining—the merits of a shareholder suit. That task is especially 
difficult because the vast majority of suits settle prior to any adjudication on the 
merits. This section introduces the potentially troubling features of shareholder 
litigation, the debate over the merits of the resulting claims, and the difficulty of 
making an uncontroversial assessment of the merits of a shareholder suit. 
A. Collective Action and Agency Problems in Shareholder Litigation  
Shareholder litigation has traditionally been thought to play an important 
role both in the enforcement of the federal securities laws and in corporate 
governance more broadly. Private securities fraud actions hold out the 
possibility of a significant private supplement to public enforcement of the 
securities laws by the SEC and other regulatory agencies.26 Similarly, fiduciary 
                                                                                                                       
25 See generally Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
107 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
26 See, e.g., Choi, supra note 7, at 598 (“Securities fraud class actions act as a 
complement to public enforcement actions on the part of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).”); Cox, supra note 2, at 497 (“The [securities] class action thereby has 
an important deterrent feature which give[s] it a quasi-public character; it can thus be seen as 
an extension of the state’s enforcement arm and an expression of society’s will.”).  
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duty actions may serve as a corporate governance mechanism of last resort 
where traditional mechanisms—such as oversight by boards of directors,27
executive compensation arrangements,28 or the market for corporate control29—
have failed to deter wrongdoing by officers and directors.30
If shareholder suits are to fulfill their promise, however, it is generally 
thought that some method of representative litigation is necessary. Individual 
stockholders often have little incentive to bring suits. Their holdings are 
generally too small to make their share of the potential recovery attractive 
enough to undertake the costs of pressing stockholder claims. In the absence of 
an aggregation mechanism, the cost of litigation is likely to exceed the value of 
any but the largest individual shareholders’ prospects of gain from a suit. This 
would prevent a suit from being brought even where stockholders as a whole 
would likely stand to gain far more from a suit than the costs of litigation.31 By 
allowing a plaintiff to proceed on behalf of a class of similarly situated 
stockholders, or on behalf of the corporation as a whole via a derivative suit, the 
potential recovery is equal to the entire loss suffered by stockholders, 
encouraging plaintiffs to file socially desirable suits.32
The great virtue of representative litigation is that it makes it practicable for 
private attorneys to police managerial misbehavior. Representative litigation, 
                                                                                                                       
27 See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1198–1200 
(1984). 
28 See, e.g., Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Ross L. Watts, Incentive and Tax Effects of 
Executive Compensation Plans, 7 AUSTL. J. MGMT. 139, 140 (1982). 
29 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate 
Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 461–65 (1986). 
30 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 10, at 216 (“[T]he private attorney general is someone 
who sues to vindicate the public interest by representing collectively those who individually 
could not afford the costs of litigation; and, as every law student knows, our society places 
extensive reliance upon such private attorneys general to enforce the federal antitrust and 
securities laws, to challenge corporate self-dealing in derivative actions, and to protect a host 
of other statutory policies.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Romano, supra note 1, at 
55. 
31 See Choi, supra note 2, at 1466 (“Shareholders of large publicly held corporations 
face a well-known collective action problem . . . . Corporations owe their shareholders 
specific duties and rights. However, due to the collective action problem, no single 
shareholder may seek to litigate these rights.”); Romano, supra note 1, at 55 (“The efficacy 
of shareholder litigation as a governance mechanism is hampered by collective action 
problems because the cost of bringing a lawsuit, while less than the shareholders’ aggregate 
gain, is typically greater than a shareholder-plaintiff’s pro rata benefit.”). 
32 See Choi, supra note 7, at 598 (“Securities fraud class actions provide dispersed 
shareholders of a corporation with a mechanism to aggregate shareholder interests in 
pursuing litigation against companies and related parties who engage in fraud. Without class 
actions, dispersed shareholders may not find litigation individually cost-effective.”); Choi, 
supra note 2, at 1466 (“Class actions, at least in theory, work to ameliorate the collective 
action problem confronting shareholders.”); Cox, supra note 2, at 497 (“Where the single 
claimant could not proceed individually because her expenses would dwarf the expected 
recover[y], the class action can be brought on behalf of all who are similarly situated.”).  
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however—whether via a class action or derivative mechanism—generates a 
new set of potential problems. Even without representative litigation, a danger 
always exists that legal claims may be brought not in the realistic expectation of 
a judgment on the merits but rather to capitalize on the nuisance value of the 
claim.33 Even a frivolous claim costs time and money to defend, and thus 
defendants may find it in their interests to settle claims even when they believe 
them to be without merit.34 Nuisance suits may be profitable whenever 
                                                                                                                       
33 It is rarely possible to define when a suit is “non-frivolous” or “socially desirable” in 
a non-controversial fashion. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 519, 529–33 (1997) (considering and rejecting a number of common definitions of 
“frivolous litigation”). For present purposes, however, we can speak somewhat loosely of a 
suit being non-frivolous where the expected benefits to the plaintiffs from a trial exceed the 
expected costs of litigation. Arguably, though, even lawsuits not meeting this definition can 
be socially desirable if—in addition to recovery to the particular plaintiffs—they provide 
some public benefit, such as general deterrence of wrongdoing or the development and 
clarification of legal rules that then serve as public goods. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 10, at 
218 (“The conventional theory of the private attorney general stresses that the role of private 
litigation is not simply to secure compensation for victims, but is at least equally to generate 
deterrence, principally by multiplying the total resources committed to the detection and 
prosecution of the prohibited behavior.”); Romano, supra note 1, at 85. If, on the other hand, 
lawsuits merely consume resources and redistribute wealth without producing desirable 
incentive effects, they may be socially undesirable even when the benefits to plaintiffs 
exceed the costs. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in 
Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 639–40 (1985); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping 
Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 646–48 (1996) (arguing 
that a goal of full compensation would lead to socially undesirable results). 
34 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 1, at 505 (describing the ability of “unscrupulous 
plaintiffs to extort nuisance-value settlements for frivolous claims”); Choi, supra note 7, at 
598–99 (“Many argue that at least some class actions are initiated in expectation of a 
nuisance settlement, paid by the defendants to avoid the distraction of litigation, high 
defense attorney fees, and the negative publicity surrounding a securities lawsuit.” (citations 
omitted)); Choi, supra note 2, at 1469 (“Getting rid of even frivolous litigation is not cost-
free. If a court is unable to verify whether litigation is meritorious at the start of the 
litigation, a class action suit may last a considerable amount of time. During this time, 
defendants will incur attorneys’ fees as well as the distraction of dealing with discovery 
(including lengthy depositions of the top officers) and negative publicity affecting relations 
with both customers and suppliers. Settling even nuisance litigation allows a company to 
avoid such costs.”); Coffee, Jr., supra note 10, at 271 (noting that corporate defense counsel 
often claims “that the corporation is better served even in a frivolous case by settling quickly 
rather than by expending time and effort litigating to a successful conclusion”); see also
Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their 
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067, 1084 (1989). Coffee cites game theory literature for the 
proposition that even where it may be in the corporation’s interest to settle even frivolous 
claims from an ex post perspective once a claim is filed, from an ex ante perspective a 
defendant may be better off in the long run developing a reputation for playing hardball in 
order to deter frivolous claims from being brought in the first place. Coffee, Jr., supra note 
10, at 271–72; accord THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 37–42, 137–39 
(1960). Because shareholder litigation tends to be a relatively rare event in an individual 
corporation’s life, however, we are dubious that the long-term gains from such a strategy 
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defendants are risk-averse or face asymmetric litigation costs.35 As Janet 
Cooper Alexander summarized the economic arguments, “high litigation costs 
and uncertainty about trial outcomes can lead to the settlement of frivolous 
suits.”36 To the extent that aggregate litigation increases asymmetries between 
plaintiff and defendant litigation costs and creates the possibility—even if it is 
only a low probability—of catastrophic damages, frivolous litigation will be 
more likely when aggregate litigation is available. The risk of frivolous 
shareholder litigation is made even more acute by the ubiquity of liability 
insurance for directors and officers that will pay some or all of the costs of a 
settlement, but will not pay if the defendants are found culpable at trial.37
Even more troubling, at the same time aggregate litigation serves as a 
potential mechanism for addressing the agency problem between shareholders 
and corporate managers, it generates a new agency problem, this time between 
the shareholders and their plaintiffs’ attorneys.38 The plaintiffs’ attorneys—who 
generally receive a share of any settlement as a contingency fee—have a 
financial stake in the claims that virtually always far outweighs that of any 
individual shareholder in a publicly traded firm.39 As Professor Alexander 
explains, “[t]he class action device makes private enforcement economically 
                                                                                                                       
would clearly outweigh the benefits of simply buying off frivolous claims when they do 
arise. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 1, at 59 (noting that “shareholder litigation is . . . an 
infrequent experience” in the life of most firms). 
35 See Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 448; Coffee, Jr., supra note 10, at 230–34; Fisch, 
supra note 10, at 554; Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 10, at 9 10.  
36 Alexander, supra note 1, at 502 n.10. 
37 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 550 (arguing that “[t]he existence and operation of 
insurance and indemnification may be the most important factor in creating a system of 
settlements that do not reflect the merits”); Choi, supra note 2, at 1469 (noting that “many 
companies have liability insurance policies for their directors and officers, many of which 
will not pay if the directors or officers are found culpable at trial . . . [so r]ather than face this 
prospect (even if unlikely), directors and officers will often settle, relying on the . . . [D&O] 
liability insurers to pay most, if not all, of the settlement award”); Romano, supra note 1, at
57 (“[A]ll states permit corporations to purchase D&O liability insurance for their 
executives, and policies can cover losses that cannot be indemnified. Policies routinely 
exempt losses from adjudication of dishonesty, but if a claim is settled, courts prohibit 
insurers from seeking an adjudication of guilt and thereby avoiding the claim’s payment.”); 
see also Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and 
Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 468 n.11 (1994) (statement of 
Marc E. Lackritz) (claiming that 96% of securities class action settlements are within the 
D&O insurance coverage limits, with the insurance usually the lone source of the settlement 
proceeds); see generally TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE 
MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 128 51
(2010). 
38 See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 1268 n.48 (2d ed. 1995); Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 
148–57. 
39 Suppose, for example, that a typical attorneys’ fee in settlement of a shareholder 
claim is 25% of the recovery. At any public firm, this stake in the outcome dwarfs that of 
virtually any public shareholder.  
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feasible for small investors by allowing a large number of small individual 
claims to be aggregated,” with the inevitable result that most of the class will 
“have only a nominal stake in the litigation.”40 The result is that, “[j]ust as 
[shareholders] lack sufficient economic interest to bring individual actions, they 
also are not motivated to sustain the information costs or expend the energy and 
attention required” to effectively monitor their attorney.41 As a practical matter, 
then, it is the plaintiffs’ attorneys and not the stockholders who decide when to 
initiate stockholder claims, how to prosecute them, and on what terms to settle 
them.42
An attorney-driven process need not necessarily be problematic if the 
incentives of the attorneys are closely aligned with those of the stockholders. 
Scholars have long argued, however, that this will often not be the case, and that 
in stockholders litigation “the conflict of interest that is inherent in all lawyer-
client relationships becomes acute.”43 As a risk-averse economic actor, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys may be tempted to settle even strong cases, as “a settlement 
offer that provided recovery of the attorney’s tangible and opportunity costs 
could loom larger than the prospect of aggressively pursuing the action to a 
more lucrative prospective judgment or settlement.”44 In addition, lacking any 
interest in the ongoing enterprise being sued, plaintiffs’ attorneys have little 
incentive to avoid bringing value-destroying nuisance claims, so long as the 
prospect of a settlement is reasonably strong.45
                                                                                                                       
40 Alexander, supra note 1, at 535. 
41 Id.; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The 
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and 
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 678–79 (1986); Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 
1593 (“Class members suffered profound collective action problems that prevented close 
monitoring of the class action attorney.”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991) (“The named plaintiff does 
little—indeed, usually does nothing—to monitor the attorney in order to ensure that 
representation is competent and zealous, or to align the interests of the attorney with those of 
the class or corporation.”); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1183, 1203 (1982); Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the 
Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class 
Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2060 (1995) (arguing that lead plaintiffs are often recruited by 
the lawyers, rather than the other way around, and often are “poorly informed about the 
theories of their cases, are totally ignorant of the facts, or are illiterate concerning financial 
matters”). 
42 See Macey & Miller, supra note 41, at 3 (“[P]laintiffs’ class and derivative attorneys 
function essentially as entrepreneurs who bear a substantial amount of the litigation risk and 
exercise nearly plenary control over all important decisions in the lawsuit.”). 
43 Alexander, supra note 1, at 535. 
44 Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1593. 
45 See Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Empirical Studies of Representative 
Litigation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 152, 155
(Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012) [hereinafter Thomas & Thompson, 
Empirical Studies] (“[I]f suits were being driven too much by lawyer interests, 
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Finally, plaintiffs’ attorneys—and the defendants sitting across the table 
from them—have every incentive to maximize the portion of the economic 
value of a settlement going to the plaintiffs’ attorneys, even at the expense of 
the shareholders. Commentators have long noted the prevalence of settlement 
agreements providing little or no tangible recovery to shareholders, while 
providing generous attorneys’ fees. In her influential study, Roberta Romano, 
for example, found that only about half of the shareholder suit settlements in her 
sample led to any monetary recovery for shareholders at all, while nearly 90% 
provided cash payments to the plaintiffs’ attorneys.46 In 8% of the settlements 
in her sample, the only relief was fees for the attorneys.47 The phenomenon has 
grown even more prevalent in recent years. A working paper by Steven 
Davidoff and Matthew Cain studying shareholder challenges to large merger 
transactions in 2010 found that nearly 80% of the ensuing litigation resulted in 
so-called disclosure-only settlements, with no financial recovery to shareholders 
at all.48 Despite the lack of any tangible recovery for shareholders, the mean fee 
provided to plaintiffs’ attorneys in such settlements was more than $700,000.49
In theory, the ability of the presiding judge to police settlements could serve as 
a constraint on the self-interest of the attorneys. In practice, however, a busy 
judge is understandably reluctant to reject a settlement that all parties before the 
court are pressing the court to accept.50
This agency problem strikes at the very heart of most stockholder litigation, 
and it has generated an enormous theoretical and empirical literature. Concern 
over plaintiffs’ attorneys’ incentives was the driving force behind the passage of 
                                                                                                                       
representative litigation could result in the attorney initiating suits with little merit, settling 
strong suits for too little, and structuring the settlement so the costs are not borne by the 
actual wrongdoers.”); Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of 
Representative Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 
NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 1762 (2012) (“Shareholder suits under both state and national law are 
most frequently representative, meaning that the typical case involves one named plaintiff 
and, importantly, one or more law firms for that prospective representative seeking to speak 
for a large body of shareholders. This can lead to litigation agency costs, for example, if 
agents bring what are perceived as strike suits or settle meritorious suits too cheaply.”). 
46 See Romano, supra note 1, at 61.
47 Id.
48 See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 9, at 37–38. 
49 See id. at 37. 
50 As Henry Friendly remarked, “[o]nce a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the 
plaintiff stockholders link arms with their former adversaries to defend [their] joint 
handiwork . . . .” Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., 
dissenting); see also Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1594 (“[T]he presiding judge, 
overwhelmed by a crowded docket and poorly armed against the possible self-interest of the 
attorneys who promoted the suit’s settlement, was not capable of effectively protecting the 
interests of the class.”). It should be noted that while Cox and Thomas described the agency 
problem in shareholder litigation, they exhibited some skepticism as to the conclusion that 
courts are ill-equipped to deal with it. See Cox, supra note 2, at 523 (arguing that even 
before the PSLRA, courts had the power to sanction frivolous suits and select appropriate 
lead plaintiffs). 
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the PSLRA in 1995.51 In particular, the crucial “lead plaintiff” provision of the 
PSLRA—creating a strong presumption that the court should pick the 
shareholder with the largest financial stake to serve as lead plaintiff52—aims to 
ensure that the lead plaintiff has the incentive and ability to select and actively 
monitor the class attorney, reducing the agency problem.53
B. Attempts to Assess the Merits of Shareholder Suits 
An enormous amount of empirical literature has attempted to determine the 
merits of shareholder suits. As a seminal paper phrased the question: Do the 
merits matter in determining when a shareholder suit will be brought and how it 
will be resolved? Or are disputes selected for litigation—and ultimately 
resolved—with little regard for the merits?54 A subsidiary branch of this 
literature seeks to determine whether the PSLRA had any effect on the merits of 
the securities class action subset of shareholder litigation. 
Two influential early studies both came to the conclusion that the merits 
seemed to count for little in shareholder actions. Roberta Romano examined a 
set of 139 shareholder suits against a randomly selected group of 535 publicly 
traded corporations from the late 1960s through 1987.55 She found that a large 
majority of suits settled, and none resulted in judgment for damages or equitable 
                                                                                                                       
51 See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging 
Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239, 1286 (“Both the statutory 
language and the legislative history of the PSLRA make manifest Congress’s concern that 
securities class counsel, if left unmonitored, will behave in ways that harm both absent class 
members and the private enforcement system generally.”); Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 
1594 (“[P]erceived agency costs prompted Congress to enact the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act in 1995.”); Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 136–37 (arguing 
that Congress’ concern with “litigation agency costs” prompted passage of the PSLRA).  
52 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2012); see also Choi, supra note 2, at 1474–75 
(“The PSLRA imposes a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff, among those seeking to 
become the lead plaintiff, who has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the 
class and is otherwise an adequate representative of the class is presumptively the lead 
plaintiff.”).  
53 See, e.g., Choi, supra note 2, at 1475 (“In theory, a lead plaintiff with a large stake in 
the litigation will have more incentive to monitor the plaintiffs’ attorney’s effort and also be 
more willing to resist excessive plaintiffs’ attorney fee awards.”); Cox & Thomas, supra 
note 2, at 1596 (“The theory behind [the lead plaintiff provision] was that institutions with 
the largest losses would have the most to gain from becoming better monitors of the conduct 
of the litigation.”); Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 41, at 2111.  
54 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 498–500. Like defining “frivolous litigation,” 
defining when a suit should be considered “merits-related” is somewhat slippery. See, e.g.,
Bone, supra note 33, at 529–33. For our purposes, we may speak somewhat loosely of a suit 
being “merits related” when either the decision to bring a claim or the resolution of the claim 
(i.e., settlement amount) is determined primarily by reference to the expected damages on 
the merits at trial, rather than being determined primarily by the prospect of litigation costs 
or a risk of erroneous judgment. 
55 Romano, supra note 1, at 58–59. 
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relief for the plaintiffs.56 As noted above, only half of settlements resulted in 
financial recovery for plaintiffs, while approximately 90% provided for fees to 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys.57 Per share recoveries were small, and non-financial 
“structural” settlements tended to be largely cosmetic.58 Romano also examined 
price reactions to lawsuits, concluding that “the wealth effects of shareholder 
litigation are negligible.”59 While “Romano’s study did not separate out suits 
based on their likelihood of being frivolous or actually merit-driven,”60 the lack 
of substantial monetary awards or other substantive relief other than attorneys’ 
fees “provides some support for the possibility that frivolous suits may drive 
many shareholder lawsuits.”61
At the same time that Romano was arguing “that shareholder litigation is a 
weak, if not ineffective, instrument of corporate governance”62 doing little to 
advance the interests of shareholders, Janet Cooper Alexander advanced a 
sweeping argument that, for much stockholder litigation, “[t]he strength of the 
case on the merits . . . becomes irrelevant to the amount of the 
settlement . . . .”63 Alexander examined a set of securities fraud cases involving 
a group of similar computer company IPOs in the early 1980s.64 She found that 
every company that suffered a market loss of at least $20 million was sued and 
that “the settlement amounts could be approximated without knowing any 
information other than the number of shares sold in the offering and the stock 
price at the beginning and end of the class period.”65 From this, Alexander 
concluded that the merits of the claims—the likelihood that the plaintiffs could 
show fraud and the amount of damage caused by such fraud—were irrelevant 
both to the decision to bring suit and to the outcome.66 While Alexander’s 
sample contained only a specific type of securities fraud class action, she 
speculated that the similar incentive structures involved in derivative litigation 
made it an “obvious candidate” for being non-merits-related.67
A number of studies have attempted to use the passage of the PSLRA to 
measure the incidence of frivolous shareholder litigation, with somewhat 
                                                                                                                       
56 Id. at 60. Combined with data on defendants’ legal expenses, Romano concludes that 
it is “plain that the principal beneficiaries of cash payouts in shareholder suits are attorneys.” 
Id. at 65. 
57 See id. at 61. 
58 Id. at 62–64. 
59 Id. at 68. 
60 Choi, supra note 2, at 1486. 
61 Id. at 1484–85. 
62 Romano, supra note 1, at 84. 
63 Alexander, supra note 1, at 505. 
64 Id. at 514–15.  
65 Id.
66 See id. at 500.  
67 Id. at 597. 
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conflicting results.68 One line of inquiry has been to examine the reaction of 
stock prices to the law’s passage, to see if they rose as a result of the hoped-for 
reduction of frivolous claims.69 Katherine Spiess and Paula Tkac, for example, 
found that a sample of high-litigation-risk firms experienced significant 
negative abnormal returns surrounding President Clinton’s veto of the PSLRA 
and positive abnormal returns upon Congress’s override of the veto,70 thus 
supporting “the hypothesis that the market viewed the PSLRA as providing a 
net benefit to the wealth of shareholders”71—presumably in part by curtailing 
previously prevalent meritless litigation. Spiess and Tkac attempted to bolster 
this conclusion by looking for differential stock price reactions based on the 
likelihood of firms facing meritorious suits, with largely inconclusive results.72
Marilyn Johnson, Ron Kasznik, and Karen Nelson undertook a similar 
event study with a somewhat different sample of companies and a different 
methodology for assessing the risk of meritless litigation.73 They again found 
evidence that the PSLRA increased shareholder wealth in industries at high risk 
for frivolous litigation.74 They then sought to correlate the benefits of the 
PSLRA to firm-specific risk of meritless litigation, finding evidence that the 
PSLRA reduced shareholder wealth slightly by making even meritorious suits 
more difficult, “but that these negative effects were dominated, on average, by 
the positive wealth effects associated with restricting frivolous securities 
litigation.”75 Again, this finding suggests that—at least prior to the passage of 
the PSLRA—the negative effects of frivolous litigation outweighed the positive 
effects of meritorious litigation. 
Ashiq Ali and Sanjay Kallapur, however, draw very different conclusions 
from their event study on the passage of the PSLRA.76 By adding several 
additional key dates to their study when events occurred either increasing or 
decreasing the likelihood of the PSLRA’s passage and by reinterpreting what 
information reached the market on dates examined in prior studies, Ali and 
                                                                                                                       
68 See Choi, supra note 2, at 1477–82 (summarizing several event studies and 
concluding that “[t]he event study evidence surrounding the passage of the PSLRA is thus 
somewhat inconclusive”). 
69 See id. at 1477 (“In theory, if frivolous suits represented a large cost to companies 
and the PSLRA worked effectively to reduce such frivolous suits, the stock market price of 
companies should have reacted positively to the enactment of the PSLRA.”).
70 D. Katherine Spiess & Paula A. Tkac, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995: The Stock Market Casts Its Vote, 18 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 545, 554
(1997). 
71 Choi, supra note 2, at 1478. 
72 See Spiess & Tkac, supra note 70, at 555–59.  
73 See Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 5 REV. ACCT. STUD. 217, 222–29 (2000). 
74 Id. at 223–26. 
75 Id. at 229. 
76 See Ashiq Ali & Sanjay Kallapur, Securities Price Consequences of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Related Events, 76 ACCT. REV. 431, 456 
(2001). 
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Kallapur arrived at the conclusion that the PSLRA likely reduced shareholder 
value for high litigation risk firms.77 This result is consistent with the view that 
the PSLRA caused more harm by hampering meritorious litigation than benefit 
by restricting frivolous litigation. 
In addition to these event studies examining the actual passage of the 
PSLRA, Marilyn Johnson, Karen Nelson, and A.C. Pritchard conducted an 
influential study78 examining stock reactions to In re Silicon Graphics,79 a 
landmark Ninth Circuit ruling that imposed an especially “stringent 
interpretation” of the PSLRA’s particularity standard for pleading.80 They 
found that the decision generated significant positive abnormal returns for a 
sample of firms facing a high litigation risk and that the abnormal return was 
substantially larger for firms within the Ninth Circuit.81 Furthermore, they 
found that firms facing the highest risk of non-merit-based litigation 
experienced the largest abnormal positive returns in reaction to the ruling.82
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that frivolous litigation imposes 
significant costs on firms and steps to curtail such litigation can bring 
substantial gains to stockholder welfare. 
While the event studies are suggestive, a number of other studies have 
attempted to focus more directly on the characteristics of shareholder litigation 
and the determinants of their outcomes. Jennifer Francis, Donna Philbrick, and 
Katherine Schipper examined ninety-one securities class actions brought 
between 1988 and 1991.83 They found that larger firms tended to attract more 
litigation, but that litigation did not appear to target “less financially 
prosperous” firms.84 They also found that targets of lawsuits tended to have 
higher beta than peer firms, though they did not experience higher incidence of 
large price drops.85 In a similar study, Christopher Jones and Seth Weingram 
found that high market capitalization, large share turnover, and lower returns 
                                                                                                                       
77 Id. at 442–46, 456. 
78 See Marilyn F. Johnson et al., In re Silicon Graphics Inc.: Shareholder Wealth 
Effects Resulting From the Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s 
Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 773–77 (2000). 
79 In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999). 
80 Choi, supra note 2, at 1482. 
81 Johnson et al., supra note 78, at 794–95. 
82 Id. at 798–99. 
83 Jennifer Francis et al., Determinants and Outcomes in Class Action Securities 
Litigation 2 (Aug. 1994) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).  
84 See id. at 11–12. 
85 See id. at 12. Beta is a measure of a stock’s sensitivity to changes in the overall 
market. A stock with a beta of one, for example, can—on average—be expected increase in 
value by 1% for every 1% increase in the broader market, while a stock with a beta of two 
can—on average—be expected to increase by 2% for every 1% increase in the market.  
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are all positively correlated with the risk of a securities fraud class action.86
Neither study focused explicitly on the merits of a typical shareholder suit. 
James Bohn and Stephen Choi, on the other hand, attempted to assess 
whether the merits affected either the incidence of litigation or the settlement 
outcomes for suits involving all IPOs from 1975 to 1986.87 They found mixed 
evidence as to the importance of the merits.88 Suits were somewhat more likely 
against firms with high quality underwriters, which they interpret to suggest that 
suits tend to target deep pockets rather than lower-quality issuances.89 They also 
find that a crude model of the potential damages provided just as good a 
prediction of the ultimate settlement amount as a more sophisticated model 
assessing the particular allegations of fraud or mismanagement, consistent with 
the proposition that the merits do not play an important role.90 They do, 
however, provide some evidence that firms facing a lawsuit had weaker 
corporate governance structures when compared to firms that were not sued.91
David Gilbertson and Steven Avila examined 314 securities class actions 
filed from 1990 to 1993.92 They looked at the time between the date when the 
alleged fraud was revealed to the market and the filing of the lawsuit, finding 
that more than half of the claims were brought within one week of the end of 
the class period.93 They interpret the fact that a large percentage of claims are 
“filed within hours or days” as “reinforc[ing] the belief that they are filed 
indiscriminately,” without regard for the merits.94
Several studies have examined securities class actions pre- and post-
PSLRA, attempting to determine whether the PSLRA has had the desired effect 
of increasing the importance of the merits. Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard, for 
example, examined a set of 119 lawsuits filed from 1991 to 2000.95 They found 
that before the PSLRA larger firms were disproportionately targeted for 
litigation, while the presence of large insider share holdings was the only merit-
                                                                                                                       
86 Christopher L. Jones & Seth E. Weingram, The Determinants of 10b-5 Litigation 
Risk 2–3 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 
118, 1996). 
87 James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence 
on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996). 
88 Id. at 950. 
89 Id. at 950–52. 
90 See id. at 971–76. 
91 See id. at 962–70. 
92 David L. Gilbertson & Steven D. Avila, The Plaintiffs’ Decision to Sue Auditors in 
Securities Litigation: Private Enforcement or Opportunism?, 24 J. CORP. L. 681, 687 88 
(1999). 
93 See id. at 692. 
94 Id. at 690 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
95 Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? Class Actions Under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 11–12 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., 
Univ. of Mich., Working Paper No. 02-011, Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 249, 
2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=349500. 
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related variable that correlated with a higher incidence of litigation.96 Post-
PSLRA, they found that other merit-related variables—including accounting 
restatements and net insider trading—became significantly correlated with the 
risk of a lawsuit.97 They also found that, post-PSLRA, an accounting 
restatement (a proxy for fraud) was positively correlated with a high-value 
settlement, defined as a settlement greater than $2 million.98 The authors 
interpret their results as evidence that the PSLRA succeeded in increasing the 
importance of the merits in filing and settlement decisions.99
Mukesh Bajaj, Sumon Mazumdar, and Atulya Sarin examined a set of 2,700 
securities class actions filed from 1988 to 1999 in federal and state courts, and 
found that the average time to settlement increased markedly following passage 
of the PSLRA.100 Whereas prior to the PSLRA, nearly 60% of cases settled 
within four years, post-PSLRA only about one-quarter of suits settled so 
quickly.101 The number of very fast settlements (less than a year) also dropped 
from 2.67% of cases to only 0.67%.102 They also found that settlement size was 
correlated to the length of time from filing to settlement, and that the average 
settlement size was substantially larger in the post-PSLRA period.103 To the 
extent that smaller, quicker settlements represent potentially frivolous suits 
brought for nuisance values, these findings support the notion that the PSLRA 
substantially diminished frivolous securities claims. 
In sum, the existing literature suggests a substantial volume of frivolous—
or at least non-merits-related—shareholder litigation in the pre-PSLRA world, 
and that the PSLRA may have gone some way towards ameliorating the 
problem with regard to securities class actions.104 Of course, any improvements 
                                                                                                                       
96 See id. at 17–18. 
97 Id. at 20. 
98 Id. at 22. 
99 Id. at 23. 
100 Mukesh Bajaj et al., Securities Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Analysis, 43 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1001, 1003, 1010 (2003). 
101 Id. at 1010. 
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1012, 1022–23 (finding mean and median settlements were $18.09 million and 
$4.24 million, respectively, in the post-PSLRA period, as compared to $8.01 million and 
$3.5 million, respectively, in the pre-PSLRA period). 
104 See Choi, supra note 2, at 1498 (“In sum, the existing literature on filings and 
settlements in the post-PSLRA time period provide evidence that frivolous suits existed prior 
to the PSLRA and that a shift occurred in the post-PSLRA period toward more meritorious 
claims.”). Choi goes on to suggest that the PSLRA may have also made it more difficult to 
bring meritorious claims, as well, calling into question whether the PSLRA can be 
considered an unalloyed good. See id.; Curtis & Morley, supra note 2, at 280 (“Our sense of 
this literature is that although a few studies have suggested that the relationship between 
merits and outcomes is weak, there appears to be a growing consensus that the relationship is 
reasonably strong.” (citation omitted)); see also Choi, supra note 7, at 598; Eric Talley & 
Gudrun Johnsen, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation and Securities Litigation
1 (John M. Olin Foundation, Univ. S. Cal. CLEO Research Paper No. 04-4, Univ. S. Cal. 
Law & Econ. Research Paper, 2004). Cox and Thomas also found that the ratio of 
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wrought by the PSLRA are restricted to securities class actions, leaving other 
forms of shareholder litigation largely unaffected. 
C. Problematic Proxies for the Merits of Shareholder Suits 
The studies canvassed above all suffer from a common problem—the use of 
unreliable proxies for the merits of a given claim. The difficulty in assessing the 
merits of claims more directly is plain and has long been recognized. In a 
typical securities class action, for example, it will be difficult or impossible to 
ascertain whether the defendants in fact violated the securities laws—by 
committing fraud, for example. It will be more difficult still to evaluate the 
strength of the plaintiffs’ evidence of violations in an objective fashion that 
facilitates easy comparison among cases. The same is true in a typical 
stockholder derivative claim. It is also likely to be impossible to determine the 
value of any settlement in a straightforward fashion, given the likelihood that a 
settlement will contain potentially important non-monetary terms.  
Professor Alexander summarized the problem as follows: 
By definition, settled cases are not adjudicated on the merits, and any attempt 
to evaluate their merits in hindsight would be unsatisfactory. One could not 
simply ask the parties or their lawyers to estimate the strength of their cases. 
Even if their responses were subjectively truthful, their perceptions would be 
colored by their adversarial role. Nor could the researcher make an 
independent judgment of the merits. Even if the resources were available to 
assimilate huge quantities of factual information and legal analysis, the 
researcher could not gain complete access to the relevant material. And even if 
these obstacles could be surmounted, the conclusions of such a study would 
ultimately amount to little more than the researcher’s subjective view of the 
merits.105
Alexander sought to surmount the difficulty she identified by restricting her 
study to a small group of cases—all involving allegations of securities fraud for 
computer company IPOs during a short time period—and simply assuming that 
the cases varied in their merits, but they were otherwise identical in relevant 
aspects.106 While plausible, the problem with this method was twofold. First, it 
resulted in a sample size so small (only six settled cases) as to render statistical 
                                                                                                                       
settlements to their calculation of “provable” losses actually declined in the post-PSLRA 
period. Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1637. 
105 Alexander, supra note 1, at 506 (footnote omitted); see also Choi, supra note 2, at 
1477 (“Whether lawsuit filings are frivolous or meritorious is particularly difficult to 
assess.”); Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1636 (referring to “the difficulty of controlling for 
all aspects of quality”). 
106 Alexander, supra note 1, at 500, 506 (“We can approximate [a] laboratory 
experiment if we can find a sample group of actual cases that are sufficiently similar and that 
can be expected to vary as to their merits.”). 
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significance a distant dream.107 Second, as Alexander acknowledged, her 
methodology left open the very real possibility that all of the cases were equally 
meritless—that each of the sued companies failed without anyone committing 
actionable fraud.108
To overcome these problems, all of the studies discussed above rely to 
some extent on proxies—often quite crude proxies—for merit.109 One 
commonly employed strategy is to examine settlement outcomes and assume 
that suits with low recoveries are meritless nuisance claims. Romano, for 
example, relies heavily on the fact that most settlements provide little financial 
benefit to shareholders, and only cosmetic governance changes.110 A number of 
studies use a dollar amount—usually around $2 million111—or a percentage of 
firm size112 as a cut-off for whether they consider a claim to be meritorious. 
Cases with settlements below the cut-off are declared nuisance suits, while 
cases with settlements above the cut-off are declared meritorious.  
Such a proxy, however, is at best only a “rough approximation,”113 one that 
is both over- and under-inclusive.114 The price a defendant is willing to pay to 
settle a nuisance claim will depend on the costs of defending the claim and the 
                                                                                                                       
107 See Cox, supra note 2, at 503 (“[O]ne may wonder whether it is appropriate ever to 
draw such a sweeping conclusion from a sample as slender as that used by Professor 
Alexander . . . .”). Cox also expresses doubt over Alexander’s failure to take into account the 
ability of some of the defendants to mitigate their damages by showing that some of the 
market decline was unrelated to their alleged misrepresentations. Id.; see also Weiss & 
Beckerman, supra note 41, at 2083–84. 
108 Alexander, supra note 1, at 514 n.53 (“The cases could all be of equal merit, of 
course, if they all had no merit (that is, if no securities laws were broken).”). Of course, even 
if the cases were all of zero merit, Alexander would have identified a real problem—the 
routine filing and settlement of nuisance claims. Id. at 523 (“This explanation raises a 
different, but equally troubling, set of questions.”). 
109 See Choi, supra note 2, at 1477 (“Tests of frivolous litigation have focused on a 
number of indirect measures.”); id. at 1477 n.36 (“[P]laintiffs’ attorneys are unlikely to 
admit to filing a frivolous lawsuit. Indirect proxies for frivolous lawsuits must therefore be 
found.”).  
110 Romano, supra note 1, at 84–85. 
111 See, e.g., Choi, supra note 7, at 613 (“I treat suits that result in a settlement of over 
$2 million as ‘nonnuisance.’”); Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 
740–43 (1995) (treating settlements for less than $2,500,000 to $1,500,000 as “nuisance” on 
the grounds that “the merits may not have mattered at all in the resolution of the litigation”); 
Johnson et al., supra note 95, at 22 (using a $2 million cut-off); Bajaj et al., supra note 100, 
at 1022–23 (using settlement size as a proxy for the merits). 
112 See, e.g., Choi, supra note 7, at 614 (using settlements for more than 5% of IPO 
value as a proxy for non-nuisance suits); Johnson et al., supra note 95, at 4 (using settlement 
amount over market capitalization as a proxy for a nuisance suit).  
113 See Choi, supra note 7, at 613. 
114 On over-inclusive proxies, see id. (“[S]ettlements under $2 million may include both 
nuisance and nonnuisance suits . . . .”). On under-inclusive proxies, see id. at 614 (“It is 
possible that a company that engaged in a large IPO may settle a nuisance suit for an amount 
greater than $2 million simply to avoid the distraction of litigation and the risk that an errant 
jury may award significant damages based on the large IPO amount.”). 
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risk of an erroneous decision leading to large damages, either of which could 
easily exceed $2 million. As such, studies showing larger settlement sizes in the 
post-PSLRA period115 may simply reflect—to take only the most obvious 
example—an increase in discovery costs with the rise of e-mail and electronic 
discovery that just happened to occur in the same general time period,116 rather 
than any increase in the merits of securities claims. Perhaps even more 
problematic, while the prevalence of small settlements may suggest a lack of 
meritorious claims, it “is equally consistent with the view that highly 
meritorious suits are brought, but settled for too little.”117
Using the speed with which a lawsuit is brought as a proxy for nuisance 
suits is similarly problematic.118 A quick filing may indicate a lack of 
investigation and a cavalier attitude towards the merits. But a highly meritorious 
case of flagrant wrongdoing would likely require little preliminary investigation 
and also result in quick filings.119
Other proxies for the merits are perhaps better, but still extremely crude. 
Any event study around the passage of the PSLRA is faced with all the usual 
uncertainties attendant upon any event study based on a legislative event that is, 
in fact, a series of smaller events of varying degrees of importance and 
predictability.120 Furthermore, such studies are, at best, attempting to measure 
the sum of at least three confounding variables that may partially overlap or 
offset each other: (1) the extent to which companies were harmed by frivolous 
litigation prior to the PSLRA, (2) the effectiveness of the PSLRA in reducing 
the harm of frivolous litigation, and (3) the extent to which the PSLRA reduced 
the benefits of meritorious litigation.121
                                                                                                                       
115 See, e.g., Bajaj et al., supra note 100, at 1022–23. 
116 See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil 
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 564–72 (2010) (describing the escalating costs of 
discovery involving e-mail and other electronic records); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS 
TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS.,
INTERIM REPORT, app. at A-4 (2008) (reporting that 87% of respondents to a survey of the 
fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers claimed that electronic discovery 
“increases the cost of litigation”).  
117 Cox, supra note 2, at 502. 
118 See Gilbertson & Avila, supra note 92, at 681, 690, 694. 
119 See Choi, supra note 2, at 1491–92 (“[Quick filings] are not necessarily inconsistent 
with meritorious litigation. Some types of claims . . . may involve large amounts of public 
evidence of fraud immediately at the end of the class period, if not before. For such 
meritorious claims, further investigation on the part of the plaintiffs’ attorneys may be 
unnecessary prior to the filing of suit, leading to short filing times.”). 
120 The passage of the PSLRA, at a minimum, involved the initial congressional passage 
of the bill, President Clinton’s veto of the bill, the House override of the veto, and the Senate 
override of the veto. Id. at 1477. Whenever an event study must deal with a “compound” 
event of this nature, the statistical correlations become more confused, and the researcher’s 
biases and priors become more problematic. See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event 
Studies and the Law: Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
141, 145–47 (2002). 
121 See Choi, supra note 7, at 616. 
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Nor is it entirely satisfactory to use—as many studies have—market 
capitalization, share turnover, share performance, and beta or other measures of 
volatility as proxies for frivolous litigation.122 The fundamental problem is that 
these measures will also tend to correlate with meritorious suits123—all else 
being equal, plaintiffs’ attorneys (and their clients) would prefer to sue when 
there is a possibility of a large recovery. As Stephen Choi has pointed out, 
attorneys would “not wish to file even a meritorious suit against a small market 
capitalization firm with low stock market turnover to the extent the potential 
damages from such a suit are low and thus unlikely to compensate the plaintiffs’ 
attorney for the relatively fixed costs of litigation.”124 A large potential recovery 
may be a necessary condition of even a meritorious claim—perhaps large, 
meritorious claims are the only ones worth bringing.125
Similar shortcomings exist for attempts to correlate merit with the amount 
of potential damages available. James Cox and Randall Thomas, among others, 
use as a proxy for merit the ratio of the settlement amount to what they refer to 
as “provable losses,” on the supposition that a small ratio indicates a low-merit 
claim settled for nuisance value.126 Models for estimated damages or provable 
losses vary but generally involve some multiplication of the magnitude of the 
stock price decline during the class period by the number of affected shares.127
Such measures are flawed in at least three ways. First, as discussed above, large 
potential damages may be a necessary condition for both meritorious and 
frivolous litigation. Second, such estimates can vary widely and may be very 
sensitive to assumptions used in the model.128 Finally, and most fundamentally, 
such measures entirely neglect highly salient aspects of the merits by implicitly 
rejecting the possibility of non-culpable explanations for stock declines. Instead, 
they implicitly assume that the relevant losses can be attributed to culpable 
behavior and that plaintiffs do not differ in their ability to prove such behavior.  
                                                                                                                       
122 See Johnson et al., supra note 78, at 807–08; Johnson et al., supra note 73 at 223–24; 
Jones & Weingram, supra note 86, at 2–3; Francis et al., supra note 83, at 11–12. 
123 See Choi, supra note 2, at 1480 (“While factors such as market capitalization, 
minimum return, and stock market beta may correlate with a frivolous suit, they may also 
correlate with meritorious suits.”). 
124 Id. at 1480–81.  
125 Id. at 1489 (“[M]arket capitalization, volatility, equity beta, and share turnover [] 
may represent necessary but not sufficient factors for both frivolous and meritorious 
litigation.”). 
126 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1627; James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC 
Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 768 n.100 (2003); see also 
Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 138–41 
(1993) (statement of Vincent E. O’Brien). 
127 See Willard T. Carleton et al., Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study,
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 491, 494–97 (1996). 
128 See id.; Cox, supra note 2, at 505 (“[E]stimates can vary widely for the amount 
recoverable by the securities class depending not only on what model is employed to 
estimate damages, but also on what assumptions are used for the model’s variables.”). 
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Bohn and Choi use underwriter reputation as a proxy for merit in their study 
of shareholder suits involving IPOs, theorizing that underwriters with good 
reputations are less likely to associate with offerings involving violations of 
securities laws.129 In addition to depending on the debatable proposition that 
bulge bracket firms like Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers would never 
commit securities fraud, this proxy for merit is confounded by the fact that 
higher-quality underwriters tend to associate with larger IPOs.130 Thus, the 
finding that high-quality underwriters are (weakly) correlated with a higher 
incidence of securities litigation could mean either that the merits do not matter 
or that even meritorious claims are only worth bringing when the potential 
recovery is large enough.131
In their studies, Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard have used somewhat more 
direct proxies for merits, looking for corporate characteristics that might be 
thought to be correlated with a greater incidence of wrongdoing.132 Among the 
factors they have used are the power of the CEO, the degree of internal 
monitoring,133 the motivation to commit fraud,134 the presence of an accounting 
restatement for the firm (along with other measures of aggressive accounting), 
and the likelihood of insider trading during the class period.135 These measures 
are an improvement over the others discussed, in that they are somewhat more 
closely related to the essential merits question—how likely is it the defendants 
have committed culpable acts? The measures are nonetheless only loosely 
related to this question, and estimating the correlation of the selected variable to 
actual wrongdoing involves a tremendous amount of what can only be described 
as guesswork. 
The only truly satisfying proxy for the merits found in the literature is that 
used by Quinn Curtis and John Morley in their study of excessive mutual fund 
fee litigation.136 In these cases, the only issue is the appropriateness of the 
funds’ fees, which are directly observable and comparable.137 They find that the 
strongest predictor of whether a mutual fund would be targeted by such a claim 
was not the size of the fees charged, but rather the size of the assets under 
                                                                                                                       
129 Bohn & Choi, supra note 87, at 952–55. 
130 Id. at 955–57. 
131 See Cox, supra note 2, at 507 (arguing that Bohn’s and Choi’s “overall data merely 
confirms that larger offerings attract not only higher quality underwriters but also cost-
conscious class action lawyers”). 
132 See Johnson et al., supra note 78, at 807–08. 
133 Such factors include the number of insiders on the board, the share ownership of 
outside directors, the presence of an audit committee and the identity of the outside auditor, 
outside block shareholders, and whether the CEO is also a founder. Id.
134 Such factors include the debt-equity ratio of the firm and whether the firm had 
recently engaged in outside financing. Id.
135 Johnson et al., supra note 95, at 15–18. Among the insider trading variables were the 
magnitude of trading activity of directors and top officers and the differences in insider 
trading from prior periods. See id.
136 Curtis & Morley, supra note 2, at 275. 
137 Id. at 277. 
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management by the targeted fund’s family.138 They suggest that this may 
indicate that such litigation is triggered less by a meritorious claim and more by 
the presence of deep pockets.139 The great advantage of Curtis and Morley’s 
methodology is that their proxy for the merits (the size of a fund’s fee relative to 
similar funds) is directly related to the key merits issue in the suits they study—
whether the fund’s fee was excessive. As we explain in Part III, stockholder 
suits challenging merger transactions offer a similar opportunity because the 
key merits question is directly related to a variable that is easily observable and 
comparable.  
III. THE STRUCTURE OF STOCKHOLDER MERGER LITIGATION
Stockholder litigation targeting merger transactions offers the possibility of 
assessing the merits of claims more directly than in earlier studies, without the 
need to resort to dubious proxies. When stockholders challenge a merger, the 
only issue that will matter to the typical stockholders of a target corporation is 
the adequacy of the price they will receive for their shares. This price is directly 
observable. Moreover, an objective—if still imperfect—measure of its 
adequacy can be obtained by comparing it to prices in comparable transactions. 
By examining the adequacy of the merger price in transactions that do attract 
stockholder litigation to the adequacy of the price in transactions that do not
attract such litigation, we can thus assess the extent to which the merits matter 
in the decision to bring a claim. We can avoid refracting the inquiry through 
some proxy that is only tenuously related to the merits or is susceptible to 
competing interpretations. 
The crucial contention, of course, is that the adequacy of the merger price is 
itself an adequate measure for the merits in stockholder suits challenging a 
merger. This contention is at least potentially contestable, in that plaintiffs in 
such suits usually must couch their claims in terms of some form of breach of 
fiduciary duty.140 Formally, then, the “merits” of the claim will depend on 
factual issues and the strength of the evidence that the defendants breached their 
fiduciary duties. As discussed more fully below, however,141 questions of 
breach of fiduciary duty and procedural propriety in this context are themselves 
primarily proxies for the underlying adequacy of the merger consideration. For 
the target company, a merger is an end-period transaction.142 The stockholders 
                                                                                                                       
138 Id. at 276. 
139 Id. at 288.  
140 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9.37 (3d ed. Supp. 2012) (“The alternative 
to an appraisal is generally a stockholder class action challenging a transaction as a breach of 
the target director’s fiduciary duties.”). 
141 See infra Part III.B. 
142 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 836 n.283 (2006) (“From the perspective of the relationship between 
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of the firm who are being merged out of existence will typically have no 
ongoing relationship with the existing directors or management. The kinds of 
governance reforms typical in settlements of other forms of stockholder 
litigation will be of no value in takeover litigation, and additional disclosure 
will be only of interest to the extent that it leads to a higher merger price.143
Whatever the procedural defects of a transaction, a challenge is only in the 
stockholders’ interests if there is reason to believe they are not receiving 
sufficient consideration. If the adequacy of the merger consideration is not the 
sole issue in determining whether a suit should be brought, it should at the very 
least be an important one. 
This Part introduces the major forms of stockholder merger litigation. First, 
we introduce the fiduciary class action and explain how such actions share the 
structural agency problems common to most forms of stockholder litigation. We 
also argue that the adequacy of the merger consideration is an excellent measure 
of the merits of such claims. Second, we introduce the appraisal action, whereby 
stockholders can refuse the merger consideration and request a court to 
calculate the “fair value” of their shares. We also argue that the structure of 
appraisal litigation is such that the merits are likely to matter a great deal. In 
appraisal actions, the adequacy of the merger consideration is the only merits 
issue. 
 This Part shows how these two similar remedies at merger create very 
different incentives for stockholders and for plaintiffs’ attorneys. In both the 
fiduciary suit and in the appraisal petition, there is a disgruntled stockholder and 
an attorney representing the stockholders. In the fiduciary suit, however, the 
lawyer is the true party-in-interest, and the stockholder serving as plaintiff is 
relatively unimportant. This situation is potentially the source of much mischief 
because it may lead plaintiffs’ attorneys to initiate and settle fiduciary class 
claims with little regard for the merits. As we explain, this contrasts with 
appraisal litigation, where the stockholder is necessarily in the driver’s seat. 
These contrasts enable us to compare the profile of appraisal litigation (where 
the merits should matter) to that of fiduciary class actions (where there is reason 
to fear the merits do not matter). This comparison is carried out in Part IV. 
A. Fiduciary Class Actions and Agency Costs in Takeover Litigation  
Delaware courts have long recognized the uniqueness of the situation when 
a board of directors agrees to a merger. The risks of managerial opportunism are 
greater in the context of a sale of corporate control than in conventional 
corporate decisions.144 Thus, the business judgment rule gives way to enhanced 
forms of judicial scrutiny that vary depending on the circumstance.  
                                                                                                                       
the board and shareholders of the target corporation, a locked-up negotiated acquisition is a 
final period transaction.”). 
143 See, e.g., Cain & Davidoff, supra note 9, at 16, 29; Romano, supra note 1, at 63. 
144 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (In control 
transactions, “[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in 
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If the sale is a friendly one to a third party, the principal risk for 
shareholders is that managers could sell the firm at a discount to a favored 
bidder in hopes of obtaining some lucrative post-transaction benefits like 
continued employment or severance payments. For this reason, Delaware courts 
will scrutinize the decisions of directors to ensure that the sale of the company 
lives up to their duties under Revlon and its progeny.145
When the board sells the company to a controlling shareholder, the risks to 
minority shareholders are even more acute, and Delaware law imposes a much 
more demanding level of scrutiny on such transactions. Under Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc. and later decisions, the transaction must be “entirely fair” to minority 
shareholders to survive judicial review.146 Boards have engaged in a wide range 
of procedural alchemy in an attempt to generate “independence” and avoid this 
exacting standard of review. For example, then-Chancellor Leo Strine recently 
used a lenient business judgment rule standard to review a merger with a 
controlling stockholder because the target company had taken two steps to 
insulate against any appearance of conflict.147 The target created an independent 
negotiating committee and conditioned the transaction on approval by a 
majority of the minority shareholders.148
Delaware also imposes a duty of disclosure on directors in most merger 
transactions.149 If directors ask shareholders to vote to adopt the merger 
agreement, or if they put shareholders in a position where they must decide 
whether to seek appraisal or accept the merger consideration, Delaware requires 
                                                                                                                       
its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an 
enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of 
the business judgment rule may be conferred.”).  
145 Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (“In 
the sale of control context, the directors must focus on one primary objective—to secure the 
transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders—and they must 
exercise their fiduciary duties to further that end.”); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985) (noting that once directors decide to sell the 
company, their “role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged 
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company”). 
146 See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (“It is a 
now well-established principle of Delaware corporate law that in an interested merger, the 
controlling or dominating shareholder proponent of the transaction bears the burden of 
proving its entire fairness.”); see also Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1374 (Del. 1993); 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); In re John Q. Hammons Hotels 
Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 758-CC, 2009 WL 3165613, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009). 
147 See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 502, 536 (Del. Ch. 2013).  
148 Id. at 502.  
149 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 372 (Del. 1993) 
(“Delaware corporations have a fiduciary duty to disclose completely all available material 
information when obtaining shareholder approval.” (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 
(Del. 1992))); see also BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 140, § 17.2 (“[T]he fiduciary 
duty of disclosure is not limited to matters requiring a stockholder vote . . . . [And it] is 
triggered in any situation in which stockholders have a right to appraisal, even if the merger 
is not one that required their vote . . . .”). 
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that directors “exercise reasonable care to disclose all facts that are material to 
the stockholders’ consideration of the transaction or matter and that are or can 
reasonably be obtained through their position as directors.”150 A potential 
remedy for a failure to satisfy the disclosure duty is quasi-appraisal.151 This 
still-inchoate doctrine in Delaware can give rise to a supercharged proceeding 
that mirrors the statutory appraisal remedy, but on behalf of all minority 
shareholders.152
Plaintiffs’ attorneys thus have a variety of claims they can deploy against 
impending mergers. In these merger class actions, the class typically consists of 
all stockholders, and opting-out is available only in extraordinary 
circumstances. As in other types of representative shareholder litigation, the 
costs of bringing the claims can be taxed against any recoveries. This means 
that the plaintiffs’ attorney has the strongest financial stake in the claim, 
virtually always far outweighing that of any individual stockholder.153 The chief 
virtue of this litigation structure is that it creates an incentive for private 
attorneys to police transactions. Some plaintiffs’ attorneys have standing 
arrangements with shareholder clients, but others must affirmatively seek out 
shareholders whom they can represent. Once the attorney has located a 
shareholder who can stand as lead plaintiff, the complaint can be filed in court 
as a class action on behalf of all stockholders. In theory, then, the claim can 
result in recovery of the entire loss suffered by the class, thus inducing the 
optimal level of deterrence.  
Merger class actions are a subspecies of the more general class of 
stockholder claims, which have historically stood as one of the chief corporate 
law mechanisms for policing misconduct, and which share many structural 
features.154 Other common examples are stockholder derivative suits and 
federal securities class actions. These stockholder suits attempt to ensure the 
fidelity of directors and managers to the interests of stockholders by enforcing 
substantive corporate and securities law rules.155 These stockholder suits 
                                                                                                                       
150 In re Wayport, Inc. Litig., 76 A.3d 296, 314 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
151 Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 133 (Del. 2009). 
152 Id. at 137. 
153 Suppose, for example, that the median attorneys’ fee in settlement of a fiduciary 
claim is 33% of the recovery. At any public firm, this stake in the outcome dwarfs that of 
virtually any public shareholder.  
154 In an earlier era, the Supreme Court noted that the derivative suit, “born of 
stockholder helplessness[,] was long the chief regulator of corporate management and has 
afforded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal of stockholders’ 
interests.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). Without the 
ability to bring a derivative claim, “there would be little practical check on such abuses.” Id.;
see also Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management 
Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 48 (Edward S. Mason ed., 
1959) (describing the derivative suit as “the most important procedure the law has yet 
developed to police the internal affairs of corporations”). 
155 Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Fiduciary Duties: The Emerging 
Jurisprudence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra
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represent one of the chief corporate law mechanisms for addressing managerial 
agency costs.156 As noted above, however, even those who praise the opt-out 
class structure acknowledge the risks associated with the conflict of interest 
between plaintiffs’ attorneys and the shareholder class.157
In the merger context, fiduciary class actions have recently become 
ubiquitous. A 2004 study by Robert Thompson and Randall Thomas first drew 
attention to the prevalence of merger class actions.158 During their two-year 
period of study, they found that merger class actions accounted for more than 
60% of the consolidated cases in the Delaware Court of Chancery.159 More 
recent research has shown merger class action filings have spread across 
multiple jurisdictions—meaning that, for example, a Delaware corporation 
might face identical complaints in Delaware court, its headquarters state’s 
courts, and in federal courts.160 This type of litigation now touches nearly all 
public company mergers. One survey of merger litigation in 2012 concluded 
that 92% of transactions larger than $100 million attracted at least one fiduciary 
class action.161
                                                                                                                       
note 45 (“The main mechanism by which state corporate law today attempts to patrol the 
behavior of those running the corporation is the law of fiduciary duty. This law is enforced 
through shareholder actions, derivative or direct, against those alleged to have violated a 
duty to the corporation.”); see also Thomas & Thompson, Empirical Studies, supra note 45, 
at 153 (“Shareholder litigation is one of the few structural limits on managerial power 
provided within corporate law itself.”). 
156 Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure 
of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1147, 1154–55 (2006) (“Whether shareholders bring a derivative claim alleging a 
wealth transfer from shareholders to management, a direct action claiming that an 
entrenched board has not acted to maximize shareholder wealth in the context of a takeover, 
or a securities claim alleging that managers misstated earnings in order to protect their 
incentive compensation packages, the underlying issue is the failure of the corporation to 
design a structure to constrain its managers from acting to benefit themselves at the expense 
of shareholders. Much shareholder litigation, in other words, arises as a result of managerial 
agency costs.”).  
157 See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 38, at 1268 n.48; Thomas & Thompson, Empirical 
Studies, supra note 45, at 155 (“[I]f suits were being driven too much by lawyer interests, 
representative litigation could result in the attorney initiating suits with little merit, settling 
strong suits for too little, and structuring the settlement so the costs are not borne by the 
actual wrongdoers.”). 
158 See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 135. 
159 Id. at 168.  
160 Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 467,
469.  
161 See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 1–2; see also ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA 
KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 1 (Feb. 2013), available at www.cornerstone.com/files/upload/Cornerstone_ 
Research_Shareholder_Litigation_Involving_M_and_A_Feb_2013.pdf (making similar 
findings).  
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B. Appraisal Litigation 
Appraisal allows a stockholder to dissent from a merger and forego the 
merger consideration in favor of filing a judicial proceeding to calculate the 
“fair value” of the stock cancelled in the merger.162 It traces its origins to basic 
changes in American corporate law at the beginning of the twentieth century.163
Older corporate codes had required the unanimous vote of all shareholders 
before a merger or other fundamental change.164 Under a unanimity 
requirement, any individual shareholder—no matter how small—could stand in 
the way of a transaction and attempt to extort a side payment in return for their 
assent. This holdout problem became severe as companies sold increasing 
amounts of stock to the public, and patterns of shareholding became more 
dispersed.165 States responded by amending their corporate codes to eliminate 
the unanimity requirement and replacing it with a majority voting rule.166 This 
change, however, stripped minority shareholders of some protection against 
expropriation by controlling shareholders.167 The appraisal remedy is 
traditionally thought to have emerged as a rough replacement.168 While 
                                                                                                                       
162 See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2013); 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
ANN. § 13.02 (2013). In this Article, we focus on mergers involving Delaware entities and 
will, therefore, largely limit the discussion to Delaware law. 
163 Appraisal rights existed in one form or another in a few jurisdictions as long ago as 
the mid-nineteenth century, but they only became widely available in their modern form in 
the early-twentieth century. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 75, 81 (1976). 
164 See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in 
Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 11–14 (1995); Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ 
Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 618–19 
(1998). 
165 See William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, 
and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69, 79–82 (“It became increasingly 
apparent to observers that great benefits to society, to the corporation, and derivatively to the 
rest of the shareholders were sometimes blocked to protect interests that seemed quite 
minor . . . to the remaining shareholders and perhaps to most outsiders.”); Thompson, supra
note 164, at 12–13. 
166 See Carney, supra note 165, at 94 (“Over the first third of the twentieth century the 
pattern of allowing fundamental changes in all corporations to take place on something less 
than a unanimous shareholder vote became the norm . . . .”). 
167 See Thompson, supra note 164, at 11–13. 
168 See, e.g., George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1642 
(2011) (“[Appraisal] mushroomed in the early 1900s, when state lawmakers granted 
appraisal rights to shareholders—apparently in exchange for an easing of merger voting 
requirements.”) (footnote omitted)); Thompson, supra note 164, at 14 (“Appraisal statutes 
are often presented as having been enacted in tandem with statutes authorizing consolidation 
or merger by less than unanimous vote.”); Wertheimer, supra note 164, at 614 (“The origin 
of the appraisal remedy typically is tied to the move in corporate law . . . away from a 
requirement of unanimous shareholder consent.”); see also Joseph L. Weiner, Payment of 
Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 548 n.7 (1927) (listing states that enacted 
an appraisal remedy in the early-twentieth century). But see Mahoney & Weinstein, supra
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minority stockholders can no longer block a transaction they view as 
disadvantageous, appraisal affords them an opportunity to exit from their 
investment on terms set by a court rather than the majority shareholders.169
The triggering events for appraisal rights differ from one state to another. In 
Model Business Corporation Act states, appraisal rights are available in the 
event of multiple types of transformational changes, including a merger, a sale 
of assets, or an amendment to the certificate of incorporation.170 In Delaware, 
by contrast, only mergers give rise to appraisal rights.171 Because our principal 
interest in appraisal here is to serve as a comparison to other forms of Delaware 
merger litigation, we restrict our attention to appraisal proceedings involving 
Delaware-incorporated targets. For public companies, the form of consideration 
also affects eligibility for appraisal. If the merger consideration is cash, 
appraisal is available, but it is not available when shareholders receive stock in 
the surviving entity.172 Even when a transaction gives rise to appraisal rights, 
stockholders must affirmatively comply with a series of procedural 
requirements to preserve their ability to pursue the remedy. In Delaware, the 
stockholder must not vote in favor of the merger,173 must make a written 
demand for appraisal and deliver it to the company,174 and must file within 120 
days of the effective date of the merger.175
Appraisal in Delaware can offer an alternative avenue of redress for 
minority shareholders who believe that the price being offered for their shares 
in a merger transaction is too low. As such, appraisal can address, in a rough 
way, the same general wrong that other forms of merger litigation seek to 
address: failure to obtain a high enough price in the sales process. This is the 
alleged misdeed at the bottom of Revlon claims, entire fairness claims, and 
                                                                                                                       
note 16, at 243 (questioning whether appraisal statutes were a direct reaction to elimination 
of unanimity requirements). 
169 See Geis, supra note 168, at 1643 (“[A]ppraisal rights were therefore enacted in most 
jurisdictions as an emergency exit from majority rule. A merger could move forward with 
less-than-unanimous approvals, but minority owners had an escape if they disliked the shift 
in direction.”); Thompson, supra note 164, at 21. In this respect—as in others—appraisal is a 
highly unusual remedy in corporate law. Shareholders do not, under normal circumstances, 
have the power to withdraw their proportional interest from the firm’s assets. See Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 
387, 434–35 (2000). Appraisal represents an unusual opportunity for shareholders to, in 
effect, withdraw their interest in the firm without having to sell their shares on a secondary 
market. 
170 See 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02(a) (2013).  
171 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2013). For purposes of comparison to merger 
litigation, we will restrict consideration to appraisal involving mergers. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. § 262(a). 
174 Id. § 262(d)(1). Such a demand is usually simply a short statement informing the 
issuer of the number of shares held and the intent to seek appraisal. 
175 Id. § 262(e). A shareholder who makes demand need not ultimately file a petition for 
appraisal because the shareholder retains the right to back out and take the merger 
consideration within sixty days of the effective date of the merger. Id.
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appraisal claims alike, and the principal reason—if not only reason—a typical 
shareholder might wish to pursue any of these claims.  
Unfortunately, appraisal has not previously been the subject of sustained 
empirical investigation, perhaps because it has long been regarded in the 
corporate law literature as a peripheral and rarely useful remedy.176 Victor 
Brudney and Marvin Chirelstein, for example, called it a “last-ditch check on 
management improvidence,”177 and Melvin A. Eisenberg described it as a 
“remedy of desperation.”178 What little empirical work has been done has 
tended to suggest that the appraisal remedy is not a particularly consequential 
form of shareholder litigation; Paul Mahoney and Mark Weinstein found no 
evidence that the availability of appraisal is associated with higher merger 
premiums for target shareholders.179 While practitioners have in recent years 
suggested that appraisal is an increasingly active area,180 academic commentary 
has remained sweepingly dismissive. The conventional wisdom remains that 
appraisal is seldom utilized,181 and the hurdles involved make it too 
cumbersome for the “typical” shareholder to profitably call upon.182 As one 
                                                                                                                       
176 Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223, 260 (1962) (“The appraisal remedy is of virtually no economic advantage 
to the usual shareholder except in highly specialized situations.”).  
177 Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and 
Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 304 (1974).  
178 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in 
Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969).  
179 Mahoney & Weinstein, supra note 16, at 242–43.  
180 See e.g., 2 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL 
CORPORATION LAW § 262.1 (5th ed. Supp. 2009) (noting that “[t]he appraisal right is alive 
and well” and contrasting that assessment with that of the first edition of the treatise); David 
J. Berger, The Growth of Appraisal Litigation in Delaware, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 5, 2013, 9:11 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/ 
2013/12/05/the-growth-of-appraisal-litigation-in-delaware/, archived at http://perma.cc/G5 
5W-3AL8 (noting a “growing tendency of institutional and other large investors to exercise 
their appraisal rights under Delaware law”).  
181 See 2 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 4, intro. note (1994). 
182 “[Appraisal] is rarely the remedy of other than the ‘wine and cheese’ crowd, for 
seldom is appraisal sought by investors whose holdings are less than $100,000 . . . .” COX ET 
AL., supra note 15, at 595–96. Of course, the vast bulk of most corporate securities are held 
by individuals and entities owning greater than $100,000, so we immediately sense that 
some of the criticisms may not be quite as devastating as the critics believe. For 
representative statements, however, of the conventional wisdom on the uselessness of 
appraisal, see, for example, Aronstam et al., supra note 15, at 546 (“[I]n practice, the 
appraisal remedy is replete with shortcomings and therefore fails to protect adequately 
minority shareholders from majoritarian abuse.”); Coffee, Jr., supra note 15, at 412 
(“Standing alone, the appraisal remedy cannot begin to assure the receipt of proportionate 
value.”); Fried & Ganor, supra note 15, at 1005 (“The shortcomings of the appraisal remedy 
are widely known. Commentators have long recognized that appraisal is a remedy that few 
shareholders will seek under any circumstance.”); Seligman, supra note 15, at 830 (arguing 
that appraisal suffers from “substantial defects in the ability of state corporate law to ensure 
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Delaware opinion noted, appraisal is “chock-full of disadvantages for 
shareholders.”183
Whatever the merits of appraisal as a standalone tool of corporate 
governance,184 it offers an excellent opportunity to investigate the merits of 
shareholder litigation. As explained below, appraisal actions have a number of 
structural features that are unique among shareholder litigation, and which 
combine to make it highly likely that the merits will matter a great deal in the 
decision to bring an appraisal claim. Because the sole issue in an appraisal 
claim—the fair value of the petitioner’s shares—largely overlaps with the most 
important practical issue in other forms of merger litigation, appraisal can serve 
as a benchmark against which to assess the merits in those other forms of 
merger litigation. 
In particular, the very “disadvantages” that have led commentators to be 
dismissive of appraisal—the inability to proceed as a class, the expense and 
difficulty of bringing a claim, and the narrow remedy—may make appraisal a 
uniquely merit-driven form of litigation. Appraisal actions are not 
representative in nature. As noted above,185 in a typical stockholder class action, 
a stockholder who does not want to be represented must affirmatively opt-out of 
the proceedings.186 By contrast, appraisal petitioners must affirmatively opt in 
                                                                                                                       
dissenting shareholders the fair value of their shares”); Subramanian, supra note 15, at 31 
(“[I]t is well accepted among academic commentators and practitioners that appraisal is a 
weak remedy compared to entire fairness review.”); see also COX ET AL., supra note 15, at
601 (“[T]he risk of considerable expense as well as the procedural difficulties in pursuing 
the [appraisal] remedy further decrease its effectiveness in protecting minority 
shareholders.”); 2 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 4, intro. note (1994) (“The practical utility of the appraisal remedy 
as a protection for minority shareholders has been the subject of much debate, and few legal 
commentators have been confident that the remedy works sufficiently well to play a major 
role in corporate governance.”). In a 2007 article, however, Kahan and Rock observed that 
hedge funds have pursued appraisal actions as a last resort. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. 
Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1021, 1038 39 (2007) (noting that “[w]hen hedge funds are dissatisfied with the terms of an 
acquisition and unable to obtain better terms, they also resort to litigation” and giving 
examples).  
183 Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 547 (Del. Ch. 2000). These disadvantages tend to 
fall into three categories: (1) the procedural burdens of preserving and asserting an appraisal 
remedy; (2) the inability to proceed as a class and shift attorneys’ fees; and (3) the narrow 
and inflexible nature of the remedy available. As noted in the text, these “disadvantages” are 
great advantages in using the merits of appraisal actions as a benchmark for other merger 
litigation. 
184 We evaluate those merits in another paper and conclude—contrary to the 
conventional wisdom—that appraisal actions hold out substantial promise as a tool of 
corporate governance. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 18 (manuscript at 1).  
185 See supra Part III.A. 
186 See In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., 59 A.3d 418, 434–36 (Del. 2012) (describing 
the limited circumstances where stockholders can opt-out of merger class actions certified 
under Rule 23(b)(2)).  
2014] THE STRUCTURE OF STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION 863 
to a proceeding by complying with the procedural requirements of the appraisal 
statute.187 Because appraisal petitioners are required to abstain or vote against 
the merger and to give notice of intent to demand appraisal, the process of 
“opting in” begins well before a petition is ever filed.188
The lack of a class mechanism has at least two important consequences. 
First, because the costs of the proceeding cannot be spread across the class,189 it 
is not possible in an appraisal proceeding to follow the typical shareholder suit 
pattern of an entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorney making an arrangement with a 
small shareholder and seeking to represent a class of all shareholders.190
                                                                                                                       
187 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2013); Thompson, supra note 164, at 41 (“No 
provision is made for a class action or other means that would permit shareholders in a 
common situation to share an attorney and other expenses of litigation easily.”). 
188 See, e.g., Ala. By-Products Corp. v. Cede & Co. ex rel. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 
657 A.2d 254, 260 n.10 (Del. 1995) (“In an appraisal proceeding, however, shareholders 
enter the appraisal class by complying with the statutory formalities required to perfect their 
appraisal rights. Thus, shareholders seeking appraisal ‘opt in’ to a class, invariably before 
suit is even filed, rather than ‘opt out.’”); 2 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7 (1994) (“[T]he appraisal remedy 
differs from the procedural rules applicable to the class action, which assume that investors 
who do not ‘opt out’ desire to be represented.”); Aronstam et al., supra note 15, at 547 
(“[T]he appraisal statute creates an ‘opt-in’ class for minority shareholders as opposed to the 
‘opt-out’ default mechanism of class action lawsuits. Thus, only shareholders specifically 
electing to opt in will be able to benefit from a judicial determination diverging from the 
corporation’s initial valuation.”); see also, e.g., Fried & Ganor, supra note 15, at 1004 n.105 
(“In Delaware, shareholders seeking appraisal are barred from using class action suits. 
Because each shareholder must pursue his own individual claim, shareholders lose the 
important economic benefits of class actions, which spread the costs of litigation and 
facilitate contingency financing.”). 
189 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND 
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 215 (9th ed. 2004) (“[T]he appraisal remedy 
lacks the class action’s ability to secure automatic representation and a greater recovery for 
shareholders.”). 
190 Gilson & Black describe the dynamic in a typical shareholder suit as such:  
Most important[ly], the [fiduciary duty] suit can be brought as a class action. Minority 
shareholders need take no affirmative action in order to participate, nor need they 
expend any resources to pursue the action. All the responsibility—both for initiating the 
action and for its expenses—is borne by the self-designated lawyer for the class who is 
compensated, one way or the other, out of the amount recovered. The lawyer then 
stands, in effect, as an independent investor who balances his estimate of the potential 
recovery to all shareholders against the cost of the proceeding and the uncertainty 
associated with its outcome.  
GILSON & BLACK, supra note 38, at 1267. Similarly, Mary Siegel notes the following:  
  Just as shareholders have financial incentives to pursue non-appraisal actions, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are similarly motivated by the size of potential fees. While most 
jurisdictions provide that attorneys’ fees in appraisal awards may be apportioned from 
the recovery, as are fees in class actions, these equivalent structures often do not 
produce equivalent results. The potential amount of the attorneys’ fees—and therefore 
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Instead, there must be a real plaintiff with a real economic stake, and it is the 
plaintiff who hires the lawyer, rather than the other way around. The collective 
action and agency problems that plague other forms of shareholder litigation 
should thus be largely absent from appraisal. In particular, effective monitoring 
from a genuine plaintiff with a meaningful stake in the recovery means that the 
collusive settlements between a defendant corporation and the plaintiff’s 
attorney that are such a danger in representative shareholder litigation will 
generally be impossible in appraisal.191
At the same time the lack of a class appraisal proceeding reduces the 
agency problem between the plaintiff and her attorney, it also greatly reduces 
the risk to defendants of catastrophic liability. Class proceedings unavoidably 
carry with them substantial in terrorem value due to the chance—however 
small—that a finding of liability will result in extremely large liability to a class 
of all shareholders.192 In appraisal, the potential liability is limited by the size of 
the petitioner’s holdings. As a result, even a large per share recovery is unlikely 
to be crippling for an acquirer. 
The other unusual features of appraisal also work to reduce the nuisance 
value of a claim and increase the chance that a decision to seek appraisal will be 
driven by the merits. Claims tend to have high nuisance value when defendants 
are risk averse and when the risks and costs of litigating the claim are strongly 
asymmetric.193 The litigation risk faced by the parties in appraisal is far more 
                                                                                                                       
their willingness to undertake a matter—is directly linked to the number of shares in the 
plaintiff class. In appraisal proceedings, the class tends to be small. In contrast, the 
representative nature of a class action does not require any action by individual 
shareholders, except for those shareholders desiring to “opt out” of the class. Ease of 
formation, coupled with a lack of financial concerns, tends to make the plaintiff group 
in class actions relatively large. The allocation of attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the 
recovery of the class, when the process is skewed toward creating a large class, may be 
the pivotal reason for the preference for class actions. 
Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 79, 103–04 (1995) (footnotes omitted). 
191 Adding to this dynamic is the fact that Delaware’s appraisal statute does not provide 
for allocating plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees to the defendant. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del. 1996) (“In the absence of an equitable exception, 
the plaintiff in an appraisal proceeding should bear the burden of paying its own expert 
witnesses and attorneys.”); Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., No. 7499, 1989 WL 17438, at 
*1109 (Del. Ch. Nov. 28, 1989) (“By its own terms the [appraisal] statute does not authorize 
the [c]ourt to tax a petitioning stockholder’s attorneys’ fees and other litigation expenses 
against the surviving corporation. Those expenses are recoverable only by a pro rata
apportionment against the value of the shares entitled to an appraisal.” (citing DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 262(j) (2013))); see also Siegel, supra note 11, at 241 (noting that Delaware’s 
appraisal statute “makes no mention of judicial discretion to allocate one party’s expert and 
attorney expenses to its opponent”). As a result, the only way for a petitioner’s attorney to 
secure payment is through the actual petitioner. 
192 See supra Part III.A. 
193 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 502 n.10 (noting that “high litigation costs and 
uncertainty about trial outcomes can lead to the settlement of frivolous suits”); Bebchuk, 
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symmetric than in other forms of merger litigation. The petitioner in an 
appraisal action faces genuine costs and risks as well. The upfront costs in time 
and money of simply preserving the ability to seek appraisal will often be 
substantial.194
Perhaps more significantly, the petitioner must forego the merger 
consideration in order to pursue appraisal. The merger consideration is thus not 
available for financing the litigation itself, and petitioners “may receive no 
return on their investment for prolonged periods of time.”195 Furthermore, 
courts in Delaware do not treat the merger price as a floor for “fair value” in an 
appraisal valuation.196 The petitioner in an appraisal action faces a serious risk 
that the court may in the end determine fair value to be less than the merger 
price, leaving the petitioner worse off than if she had simply taken the merger 
                                                                                                                       
supra note 10, at 448; Coffee, Jr., supra note 10, at 230–31; Fisch, supra note 10, at 546; 
Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 10, at 9–10.  
194 The literature on appraisal frequently emphasizes the complexity and expense of 
bringing an appraisal claim. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 508 
(1986) (“[A]ppraisal is often a cumbersome remedy.”); PETER V. LETSOU, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 429 (2006) (noting that 
shareholders must navigate a “complicated maze . . . to successfully assert appraisal rights”); 
Fried & Ganor, supra note 15, at 1004 (asserting that “[a]ppraisal litigation is complicated 
and expensive” and that “many shareholders find it difficult to meet the complicated 
procedural requirements and deadlines of the appraisal remedy”). 
195 Siegel, supra note 190, at 103. Randall Thomas examined appraisal actions filed 
between 1977 and 1997 and reported that the average time from the filing of an appraisal 
action to the completion was approximately two years. Randall S. Thomas, Revising the 
Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1, 22 (2000). Petitioners are, however, awarded 
an interest rate on any amounts they receive in a judgment. Our analysis of data from 
reported opinions reveals that, in the seventeen cases where judges specified the interest rate, 
they awarded interest of, on average, 7.9%, and it was compounded quarterly or monthly. 
Appraisal petitioners thus can anticipate being compensated for the duration of an appraisal 
proceeding. The Delaware legislature recently amended the appraisal statute to provide for a 
floating rate of interest equal to 5% above the federal funds rate. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 262(h) (2013). On the one hand, in an era of historically low interest rates, this may 
represent an attractive option for shareholders. On the other hand, it may not fully 
compensate plaintiffs for the opportunity costs of their capital by replicating the return that a 
shareholder could have achieved by investing the merger proceeds in some portfolio of 
similarly risky securities. In particular, there is at least some risk that the respondent will go 
bankrupt, making recovery impossible. 
196 See, e.g., Aspen Advisors LLC v. United Artists Theatre Co., 861 A.2d 1251, 1262 
(Del. 2004) (noting that appraisal petitioners can receive “a possibly higher (or possibly 
lower) ‘fair value’ award”); Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 
290, 310 (Del. Ch. 2006) (noting that the court in an appraisal action “must determine the 
fair value . . . regardless of whether that amount is greater or less than the merger price”); 
Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d 305, 312 (Del. Ch. 2005) (noting that “a minority 
stockholder faces the prospect of receiving less than the merger price in the appraisal 
action”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. 
Ch. 2004) (“In this case, . . . the fair value standard operates to leave the . . . petitioners[] 
with less than they would have received had they accepted the [m]erger consideration.”). 
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price.197 This risk stands in contrast to fiduciary duty class actions, where the 
plaintiffs have usually already received the merger consideration and face no 
financial downside.198 In short, fiduciary litigation presents shareholders with 
costless option value that is lacking in appraisal actions. 
The single-issue nature of appraisal also serves to reduce the possibility of 
nuisance suits. The only issue at stake is the fair value of the petitioner’s shares, 
and the sole remedy available is cash. As a result, there is no possibility of the 
kind of collusive “disclosure only” settlement that is so prevalent in fiduciary 
duty class actions, whereby the defendants agree to provide additional 
disclosure of dubious value to shareholders while providing substantial fees for 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys.199 In appraisal, a claim settles either for cash or not at 
all. In addition, the possibility of an injunction or rescission in a fiduciary duty 
class action—even where it is not truly what the plaintiff wants—may provide 
settlement leverage that is absent from appraisal, where such remedies are not 
available.200
The narrow focus of the merits issue in appraisal also reduces asymmetry in 
litigation costs. While litigating fair value is hardly cost-free, the scope of the 
proceedings is fairly limited, and discovery is restricted to materials bearing on 
the value of the firm and the negotiation of the merger price. Petitioners 
typically will seek production of basic financial and deal information—most of 
which will have already been gathered during the merger process—and both 
sides will hire experts to conduct valuations and testify at trial. In fiduciary duty 
suits, by contrast, the claims involved will often be fact-intensive, involving 
questions of materiality and scienter that can be used to justify sweeping 
discovery requests—including, for example, years of e-mails from dozens of 
executives. The ability to impose these large and asymmetric costs on 
defendants may result in it being cheaper to simply pay a nuisance settlement 
than to proceed to trial. The costs of appraisal will tend to be much more 
symmetric. Furthermore, the lack of a class action mechanism will mean that 
the petitioner will be unable to spread her costs across a class of all 
shareholders. 
Insurance also plays less of a distorting role in appraisal. In a fiduciary duty 
class action, director and officer liability insurance (D&O insurance) is typically 
available to pay all or most of the costs of a settlement. Many insurance 
policies, however, exclude coverage where a claim proceeds to trial and the 
                                                                                                                       
197 Siegel, supra note 190, at 103 (“[S]hareholders in appraisal actions risk the 
possibility of receiving less than the transaction price.”). In our examination of appraisal 
opinions, five of the forty opinions (12.5%) gave the appraisal petitioners a lower price than 
they would have received in the merger. The lowest gave the petitioner an award that was 
19.8% lower than the merger price. 
198 Id.
199 See supra Part II.A. 
200 See Siegel, supra note 190, at 104 (“The ability to seek an injunction or rescissory 
damages significantly strengthens the minority’s bargaining power. As a result, plaintiffs are 
drawn to class actions to air a broader range of grievances.” (footnote omitted)). 
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defendants are ultimately found culpable.201 Such policies give defendants a 
powerful incentive to settle claims before trial, rather than face even a small 
chance of ending up personally liable for damages. In appraisal, the recovery 
simply comes from the acquirer, and issues of culpability and personal liability 
are not involved. 
The net result is a situation—unique in shareholder litigation—where the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are unable to receive significant fees unless the actual 
named plaintiff receives a substantial monetary recovery. The parties could of 
course provide for attorney’s fees in a settlement agreement, but that fee would 
be coming directly out of the petitioner’s recovery and, in theory, the petitioner 
can monitor that agency relationship very closely. In sum, the structure of 
appraisal makes it far more likely than for other forms of merger litigation that 
the merits will play an important role in the decision to litigate. The agency 
problem is absent or much reduced, and the parties are faced with far more 
symmetrical risks and costs in the proceeding.  
This is not to suggest that abusive appraisal litigation is not possible or that 
a stockholder will never find it profitable to file a “nuisance” petition. Fending 
off a meritless appraisal claim would not be costless, and an acquirer may be 
tempted to simply pay the petitioner enough to go away. There are no grounds 
on which to dismiss an appraisal petition before trial, and from a defendant’s 
perspective, the litigation costs of defending an appraisal case are the same 
whether the petitioner holds one share or one million. Thus, the plaintiff’s 
attorney might find a small holder and threaten to put the defendant through the 
costs of defending the claim. Defendants may wish to avoid those costs and 
swiftly resolve litigation involving the merger, and as a result defendants may 
settle appraisal claims with small holders for nuisance value.  
Such a possibility, however, is inherent in any form of litigation. There 
would be little to distinguish appraisal in this regard from a meritless contract 
claim, defamation claim, “slip-and-fall” claim, or any other type of potentially-
vexatious claim. To the extent, then, that other forms of merger claims display 
less merit than appraisal claims, we can be confident that the low merit of the 
merger claims stems from the particular features of aggregate shareholder 
litigation, rather than from the risk of nuisance claims inherent in any form of 
litigation. To the extent that agency costs and other particular structural features 
are driving the pathologies of shareholder litigation, we would expect these 
pathologies to be much reduced in appraisal litigation. 
IV. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF MERGER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 
AGAINST DELAWARE FIRMS
We are now in a position to investigate whether the merits matter in 
fiduciary class actions. As discussed above,202 in asking whether the merits 
                                                                                                                       
201 See supra note 37.
202 See supra Part III. 
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matter, the real question is how mergers are selected for litigation. Are plaintiffs 
targeting deals where there is reason to believe the merger consideration was 
inadequate? Or are they simply seeking defendants with deep pockets who may 
be willing to settle for nuisance value?  
If this dynamic is at work in merger litigation, we would expect to find that 
large transactions are disproportionately targeted for suit and also that the 
adequacy of the merger price has little or no predictive power.203 To test these 
propositions, we compiled a set of transactions from the Thomson One database 
of merger transactions with Delaware-incorporated, public company targets that 
closed between 2004 and 2013. To be able to perform a direct comparison of 
transactions attracting fiduciary duty class actions and transactions attracting 
appraisal petitions, we restricted our sample of transactions to those where 
appraisal was available. For this universe of transactions, we collected data on 
the incidence of merger class action litigation and on the incidence of appraisal 
litigation.204 This allows us to compare the selection of merger transactions for 
challenge via different types of shareholder litigation.  
Consistent with conventional wisdom, fiduciary duty class actions were 
substantially more common than appraisal. Out of 1,168 appraisal-eligible 
transactions for which litigation data was available, 683 attracted at least one 
fiduciary class action. By contrast, only eighty-seven transactions involved a 
counseled appraisal petition, with an additional seven transactions attracting 
only pro se petitions.205 Table 1 presents the general pattern of litigation.  
                                                                                                                       
203 There may be some reason to expect larger deals to attract more appraisal action, in 
that a larger corporation is likely to have more minority shareholders with a large enough 
stake to potentially justify the costs of an appraisal action. Nonetheless, we would expect the 
size of the merger premium to be the most predictive single variable. 
204 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 140, § 9.30 (Supp. 2009) (noting that a 
shareholder opposing a merger “can seek judicial relief from the merger, generally by 
attacking the fairness of the merger or asserting his right to an appraisal where one exists”).  
205 While we will occasionally discuss pro se appraisal petitions, for the most part the 
discussion will focus on counseled appraisal petitioners. This is both because counseled 
petitioners are far more economically significant and because we are interested in assessing 
the role of the lawyer and agency costs in the selection of disputes for litigation. Whatever 
factors might determine when a pro se claimant files suit, an agency problem with counsel 
cannot be among them. 
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Table 1: Incidence of Fiduciary Claims and Appraisal Claims 
Fiduciary Class Action 
No Yes Total 
A
pp
ra
is
al
 
(C
ou
ns
el
ed
) No 470 611 1,081 
Yes 15 72 87 
Total 485 683 1,168 
In evaluating how disputes were selected for either type of litigation, we 
examine two principal metrics. The first represents the size of the transaction, 
which should be only weakly correlated to the merits but which will correspond 
strongly with the nuisance value of the claim.206 The second represents the 
adequacy of the merger consideration, which we believe should be strongly 
relevant to the merits.207 We consider these two metrics below. All else being 
equal, a large merger premium should suggest a strong merger claim and a 
small merger premium should suggest a weak merger claim. By contrast, we 
would expect there to be only a weak relationship between the sheer size of the 
transaction and the merit of a claim.208 We consider these two metrics below.  
In this Part, we examine transactions where stockholders pressed fiduciary 
duty class actions, and in the next Part we perform a similar analysis for 
appraisal. 
A. The Importance of Transaction Size 
Over half of the transactions in our dataset of appraisal-eligible mergers 
(683 out of 1,168) attracted at least one fiduciary suit, and many transactions 
attracted multiple suits. To examine the effect of deal size on the likelihood of 
litigation, we used two measures of the value of the transaction: (i) “enterprise 
value” (the total merger consideration); and (ii) “equity value” (the amount of 
merger consideration allocated to the shareholders). Both are calculated in 
constant 2013 dollars.  
The transactions shareholders selected for fiduciary suits were significantly 
larger than other transactions by both measures of transaction size. Table 2 
presents mean and median transaction sizes for the transactions that attracted no 
                                                                                                                       
206 See infra Part IV.A. 
207 See infra Part IV.B. 
208 As is discussed below, there might be some innocent reasons to think shareholders 
will disproportionately target large transactions and deep pockets. Plaintiffs’ attorneys need 
some assurance that the potential recovery will be sufficient to cover the fixed costs of 
litigating the claim. In short, deep pockets may be a necessary, but not sufficient, criterion 
for bringing a claim. See infra Part IV.D. 
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fiduciary suits, those that attracted at least one suit, and the 128 transactions that 
attracted six or more suits.209
Table 2: Comparison of Transaction Size in Fiduciary Cases,  
in Millions of 2013 Dollars 
Equity Value Enterprise Value 
Mean Median Mean Median 
No Fiduciary Suit $1,320 $245 $2,146 $265 
At Least One 2,466 644 3,107 748 
Six or More 5,519 1,523 6,592 1,571 
The differences between nearly all of these groups are statistically 
significant beyond all conventional levels.210 The strong relationship between 
transaction size and the incidence of fiduciary suits can be seen visually. The 
difference is clearly visible in Figure 1, which shows kernel density plots211 of 
the log equity value of transactions attracting fiduciary litigation (in gray) and 
those not attracting such litigation (in black). 
                                                                                                                       
209 Among all transactions, six was the 90th percentile in the number of fiduciary suits.  
210 The p-values of two-sided t-tests between any two groups (measured in log dollars or 
raw dollars) is always smaller than 0.002, except for the difference between raw enterprise 
value for sued and un-sued transactions, where the p-value is 0.128.  
211 A kernel density plot is a form of smoothed histogram that allows the estimation of 
the shape of an underlying function from a finite number of discrete observations. See 
generally B. W. SILVERMAN, DENSITY ESTIMATION FOR STATISTICS AND DATA ANALYSIS 58 
(1988). 
2014] THE STRUCTURE OF STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION 871 
Figure 1: Value for Transactions with Fiduciary Litigation (Gray) 
As Table 2 and Figure 1 reveal, fiduciary suits target large deals.212 High 
levels of fiduciary litigation activity, with six or more suits filed, are associated 
with especially large deal sizes—more than four times the mean for deals with 
no fiduciary suits (equity value of $5.5B vs. $1.3B). The first major empirical 
result, then, is that merger litigation is disproportionately targeted towards 
larger deals and deeper pockets, and the larger the deal the more intense the 
litigation activity. 
B. The Unimportance of the Merger Premium 
Our metric of merit is the merger premium. The adequacy of the premium 
should correlate both to the likelihood of fiduciary failure and to the magnitude 
of the damages in the event of liability. Other “merits-related” issues, such as 
procedural or disclosure shortcomings in the merger process, are likely to be of 
concern to shareholders only insofar as they lead to inadequate merger 
consideration. Thus, if the merits matter, so should the size of the merger 
premium, which is directly observable. 
The measure of merger premium that is relevant for fiduciary plaintiffs is 
the initial premium offered to shareholders. The price at the announcement of 
the transaction is the one that plaintiffs’ attorneys must evaluate when deciding 
whether to challenge the transaction. The raw size of the merger premium for 
any given deal is, however, not a particularly satisfactory measure of the 
adequacy of the merger consideration (and, thus, the merits of the claim). This 
is so because average merger premia vary widely across industries and across 
time, with average premia being much higher, for example, in 2007—in the hot 
deal market before the onset of the financial crisis—than in 2009, during the 
                                                                                                                       
212 A plot using enterprise value rather than equity value looks virtually identical. 
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cold deal market in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. Furthermore, as we 
might expect, larger deals tend to involve smaller premia as measured in 
percentage terms. In order to serve as a more accurate proxy for merit, we need 
a measure of the adequacy of the merger premium, as compared to some 
“expected” premium given the characteristics of the deal.  
To achieve this, we computed an “expected” merger premium based on the 
most salient variables: the size of the target company,213 the year of the 
transaction, and the target company’s industry. We then used the residual 
premium—the difference between the expected premium and the actual 
premium—as our proxy for the merits of the underlying legal claim.214 Thus, a 
positive residual indicates that the actual merger premium was greater than the 
expected merger premium. Meanwhile, a negative residual indicates that the 
actual merger premium was less than the expected merger premium and thus, all 
else being equal, more likely to be inadequate. For both fiduciary and appraisal 
actions, we would expect that the size of the residual premium should be 
negatively correlated with the merits of a claim—a positive residual premium 
implies a less meritorious claim, while a large negative residual premium ought 
to suggest a stronger claim, all else being equal.  
In contrast to transaction size, we find that the deal premium appears to play 
little role in the incidence of fiduciary litigation. We calculated a residual 
premium based on three measures of actual premium: the one-day premium, the 
one-week premium, and the four-week premium. Table 3 shows the mean and 
median deal premia residuals for transactions with no fiduciary litigation, those 
with at least one suit, and those with six or more.  
                                                                                                                       
213 In order to avoid circularity, we use the market value of the target company four 
weeks prior to the merger announcement as the measure of the target’s size. By using this 
measure, we avoid the problem of having the target company’s market value be distorted by 
the proposed terms of the merger. 
214 The procedure used here is similar to that employed by Morley and Curtis in their 
analysis of excessive fee litigation targeting mutual funds. See Curtis & Morley, supra note 
2, at 286. Rather than simply using the raw size of the fee charged by the relevant mutual 
fund as their measure of merit for excessive fee litigation, they first calculate an average fee 
for funds with a similar investment style, and then subtract that average from the individual 
fund’s actual fee. Id. The result is what they call the “style-demeaned expense ratio.” Id. 
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Table 3: Comparison of Merger Premia Residuals in Fiduciary Cases
 1-Day Premium 1-Week Premium 4-Week Premium 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
No Fiduciary 
Suit 2.7% -3.5% 4.0% -3.4% 4.2% -2.8% 
At least one -1.5 -5.0 -1.5 -5.2 -1.9 -5.1 
Six or more 0.8 -0.8 0.2 -0.2 2.1 -2.4 
Transactions targeted by fiduciary suits have lower deal residuals than non-
targeted transactions, though the intense litigation activity does not appear to be 
associated with lower premia. Furthermore, none of these differences in 
residuals are statistically significant at any conventional levels. Figure 2 
illustrates the strong similarity in one-week premia between those transactions 
that attracted fiduciary litigation (in gray) and those that did not (in black).215
Figure 2: One-Week Initial Premium Residuals for Transactions with 
Fiduciary Litigation (Gray) and Without (Black) 
Transactions attracting fiduciary litigation do not appear to have premia that 
are statistically distinguishable from those not attracting fiduciary litigation. To 
the extent deal premia measure the merit of fiduciary litigation, the transactions 
that were sued were not stronger legal claims than the un-sued transactions.  
                                                                                                                       
215 The plots for residuals on the one-day premium and the one-week premium are 
similar.  
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C. Empirical Analysis of the Incidence of Fiduciary Suits 
We use regression analysis to further investigate what drives the selection 
of transactions for fiduciary litigation. The most basic question is what factors 
are associated with the filing of a fiduciary suit against a transaction, and we 
investigate this question with a logistic regression model. Our dependent 
variable is a dummy that we assign a value of one if the transaction faced one or 
more fiduciary class actions and zero otherwise. As independent variables we 
used the size of the transaction, the residual premium, and variables indicating a 
going-private transaction or a financial buyer.216 We present our results in Panel 
A of the Appendix. Regardless of what variables we use in our regression, the 
coefficients on transaction size—whether measured in equity value or enterprise 
value—are positive and statistically significant beyond the 1% level. The 
coefficient on the deal premium’s residual variable is negative and consistently 
significant. Across all specifications, the coefficients on our variables of interest 
are relatively similar, suggesting that our results are robust. The presence of a 
financial buyer like a private equity fund is also positive and strongly 
significant. These results suggest that the merits do matter to at least some 
extent. 
To get a sense of the relative magnitude of the effects that these variables 
have on the incidence of a fiduciary suit, we calculated the marginal effects at 
the mean. In Model 3, for example, a one standard deviation increase in the size 
of the transaction increases the likelihood of a fiduciary suit by 16.9%.217 A one 
standard decrease in the one-week premium residual produces a 6% increase in 
the likelihood of a fiduciary suit.218 The presence of a financial buyer is 
associated with a 20% increase in the probability of suit.219
We also ran a logistic regression where our dependent variable takes the 
value 1 if the transaction attracted six or more fiduciary suits using the same 
independent variables. These results appear in Panel B of the Appendix. These 
results show a highly significant effect for both measures of transaction size but 
no statistically significant effect for any measure of deal premium residual. The 
going-private variable is significant at the 10% level and the coefficient is 
positive, as is the presence of a financial buyer. 
To look beyond the simple yes-or-no question of whether a fiduciary class 
action was filed, we examine the intensity of litigation activity. Among the 
transactions that are sued, litigation activity varies. The mean number of suits 
filed was 2.2 and the standard deviation was 3.2. Of the 683 sued transactions, 
approximately half attracted only one or two filings, while forty-four 
transactions resulted in ten or more complaints being filed. We can thus look at 
                                                                                                                       
216 These last two variables are dummy variables that take a value of one if the deal has 
that characteristic (i.e., a financial buyer) and zero if it does not. 
217 The 95% confidence interval is between 13.4% and 20.4%.  
218 The confidence interval spans from a 0.6% to an 11.2% increase.  
219 The confidence interval spans from a 13.5% increase to a 27%. 
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the number of fiduciary complaints that a transaction provokes, treating this 
number as a proxy for the intensity of plaintiffs’ attorney interest in a deal.  
To investigate what factors induced greater litigation activity, we ran a 
Poisson regression where our dependent variable was the number of fiduciary 
complaints filed. We used the same independent variables relied on in our 
logistic regressions above. Our results are reported in Panel C of the Appendix. 
In all specifications, we obtain estimates of all coefficients that are statistically 
significant beyond the 1% level. The coefficient for our size variables is always 
positive, and the coefficients for our premium residual variables are always 
negative. 
As with the logistic regression, we can estimate the magnitude of these 
effects,220 and these are consistent with the results of the logistic regression. 
Transaction size has a much larger effect on the incidence of fiduciary litigation 
than the premium residual. In our Poisson regression, a one standard deviation 
change in transaction size from the mean implies 1.1 additional fiduciary class 
action suits.221 With deal premium, a decrease of one standard deviation from 
the mean implies 0.4 additional suits.  
D. Interpreting Our Results 
While both deal size and deal premium appear to be relevant, the variable 
with the strongest effect on the incidence and intensity of fiduciary litigation is 
transaction size, dwarfing in magnitude the effect of deal premium. Given that 
transaction size has a substantially weaker relationship to legal merit, we 
conclude that fiduciary litigation is largely driven by non-merits factors. We are 
nevertheless sensitive to two potential counter-arguments: (i) that class action 
plaintiffs might disproportionately target large deals even if the merits do 
matter; and (ii) that the size of the merger premium is not necessarily relevant to 
the merits. We address these arguments in turn.  
In our analysis, we assume that the size of the transaction should not be 
strongly correlated with the merits, and thus it should not be the key factor in 
deciding to bring suit. It is this assumption that allows us to infer that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys are seeking deep pockets and high nuisance value rather than 
meritorious claims. This is, however, not the only interpretation possible. Even 
if the merits did matter, we might expect plaintiffs’ attorneys disproportionately 
to target large deals, where the potential damages are large enough to make the 
claim worthwhile. Phrased differently, perhaps a large potential recovery is a 
necessary condition for bringing even a meritorious claim—perhaps large, 
meritorious claims are the only kind worth bringing.222
                                                                                                                       
220 For the sake of consistency, we again use Model 3 to generate our estimates. 
221 The 95% confidence interval is 1.0 and 1.2 additional suits. 
222 See supra Part IV.B; see also Choi, supra note 2, at 1480–81 (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys 
[would] not wish to file even a meritorious suit against a small market capitalization 
firm . . . to the extent the potential damages from such a suit are low and thus unlikely to 
compensate the plaintiffs’ attorney[s] for the relatively fixed costs of litigation.”); Id. at 1489 
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We regard it as unlikely that this is the dynamic driving our results. The 
potential (non-nuisance) value of a claim should be the product of three major 
variables: (i) the probability of prevailing at trial; (ii) the amount (in percentage 
terms) by which the merger price was too low; and (iii) the size of the 
transaction.223 At most, the size of the transaction should be as important as the 
inadequacy of the merger price. More likely, it is substantially less important. If 
small transactions are more likely to involve lower-quality lawyers and bankers, 
and a correspondingly higher chance of the types of procedural deficiencies that 
could lead to liability, this should cut against the importance of deal size.224
Furthermore, to the extent that factors (i) and (ii) are correlated (i.e. particularly 
egregious breaches of duty lead to particularly low merger prices), the 
inadequacy of the merger price should be more important than the deal size. 
This is not what we observe. Instead, we observe that the deal size matters a 
great deal, overshadowing the inadequacy of the merger price.  
Similarly, it might be argued that the residual merger premium is not an 
adequate proxy for the merits of a fiduciary duty class action. After all, actually 
showing liability in such claims will generally turn on the ability to show a 
breach of fiduciary duty, rather than simply showing that the price was too 
low.225 This criticism, however, misses the mark.226 As noted above, even if the 
inadequacy of the merger premium was wholly uncorrelated with the ability to 
show breach of duty, it would still be relevant to potential damages at trial. 
Again, at the very least, even if the inadequacy of the merger consideration is 
wholly uncorrelated to the chances of success on the merits, it should still be as
important as the deal size in determining whether to bring suit. Instead, we find 
that the premium has a much smaller effect on the decision to sue. 
Furthermore, it strikes us as implausible that the residual merger premium is 
uncorrelated to the chances of success on the merits. Much of the logic of 
imposing Revlon duties or similar requirements is that the failure to do so could 
lead to a failure to maximize shareholder value. This is, in part, why the residual 
                                                                                                                       
(“[M]arket capitalization, volatility, equity beta, and share turnover [] may represent 
necessary but not sufficient factors for both frivolous and meritorious litigation.”).
223 See supra Part III.  
224 See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION 139 (2006), available at www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-
finalreport.pdf (noting that “small firms consistently have more misstatements and 
restatements of financial information, nearly twice the rate of large firms”) 
225 See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 35 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[A] breach of 
fiduciary duty claim seeks an equitable remedy that requires a finding of wrongdoing. The 
appraisal proceeding seeks a statutory determination of fair value that does not require a 
finding of wrongdoing.”). For a dramatic example of the fact that these two questions are not 
always equivalent, compare Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1176–77 
(Del. 1995) (affirming a determination that a merger price of $23 per share was entirely 
fair), with Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 884 A.2d 26, 30 (Del. 2005) (awarding fair value 
in appraisal of $28.41 per share for the same transaction). 
226 See supra Part IV.C. 
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merger premium makes a superior proxy for the merits than others used 
previously for securities fraud cases, such as volatility and share turnover.227
While such measures are (like the residual merger premium) correlated to the 
potential damages on the merits, they (unlike the residual merger premium) lack 
any close correlation to the presence of culpable conduct. In addition, even the 
correlation to the potential damages on the merits is weaker for these other 
proxies, in that in other forms of shareholder litigation the possibility exists that 
non-monetary remedies—such as governance reforms—may carry meaningful 
value. By contrast, in merger litigation—an end-period transaction for the 
shareholders—monetary damages are the only meaningful remedy.  
E. Do the Merits Matter in Other Ways? 
We have thus far ignored a different and important way that merit might 
potentially affect fiduciary class actions: the outcome of fiduciary class actions 
may be merits related, even if the decision to bring an action is not. Thus, 
another way of evaluating the merit of fiduciary suits in the merger context is to 
examine the relationship between suits and increases in transaction price. It 
would be bizarre, of course, to discover that the merits did not matter in filing 
claims but did matter in the outcome of the claims. If outcomes showed any 
consistent relationship to the merits, it would be more than a little strange for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to ignore the merits in deciding whether to bring suit. 
Instead, we would expect them to disproportionately target transactions where a 
highly positive outcome is expected. Nonetheless, the possibility is worth 
exploring. 
In the preceding analysis, we relied on the initial merger price as our 
estimate of merit and use that variable in our regressions to predict the 
incidence of litigation. Given that changes in the merger price can occur after 
the filing of lawsuits, we can ask the natural next question: is the incidence of a 
fiduciary suit associated with an increase in merger price? A merger price might 
increase for a variety of reasons: a topping bid from a new suitor, a concerted 
pressure campaign by activist shareholders, or the defeat of the transaction by 
shareholders and a subsequent price increase to attract more votes. And of 
course the merger price might increase as a direct or indirect result of fiduciary 
litigation.228 We are relatively indifferent as to the cause of the increase and ask 
only the threshold question of whether plaintiffs’ attorneys target transactions 
where the merger price ultimately increases. Either explanation would be 
sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiffs’ attorneys take some estimate of merit 
into account in targeting transactions: either that they can cause the price to go 
up or they can predict where someone else will think the company is 
                                                                                                                       
227 See supra Part IV.B. 
228 As others have shown, the vast majority of cases result in a “disclosure only” 
settlement and with no tangible recovery at all for shareholders. See Cain & Davidoff, supra 
note 9, at 35 (reporting that approximately 80% of the fiduciary duty class actions in 2010 
ended in disclosure only settlements). 
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underpriced and cause the price go up (perhaps enabling the attorneys to claim 
some credit for the increase).  
In fact, the final merger consideration for transactions that were sued 
increased by 2.5% on average, and for un-sued transactions the mean increase 
was 2.1%. This difference, however, is not statistically significant.229 We ran an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to investigate the connection further 
where our dependent variable was the increase in merger price, and our 
independent variables were the size of the transaction, the presence of a 
fiduciary suit, the number of fiduciary lawsuits, a going-private variable, and a 
financial buyer variable.  
Panel D in the Appendix reports our results. Our results show that fiduciary 
suits have no measurable effect on increases in the merger consideration. While 
the coefficients are positive—indicating that fiduciary suits correlate with a 
larger increase in merger consideration—neither the incidence nor the intensity 
of the suit has a statistically significant coefficient. The only variables that are 
strongly associated with a change in the transaction price are the going private 
dummy variable and the financial buyer dummy variable. The sign on the 
coefficient for the going private dummy variable is positive, suggesting that 
controlling shareholders are often forced to raise their bids. The sign on the 
financial buyer variable is negative, suggesting that financial buyers are not 
associated with topping bids, perhaps because they are often involved in 
auctions that induce the best possible bid or perhaps because they insist on deal 
protections like termination fees that inhibit additional bidding.  
Taken together, our empirical results suggest that fiduciary class actions 
targeted large transactions and deal price is not as important to fiduciary 
plaintiffs. We also find that the incidence of fiduciary class actions is not 
associated with significant increases in the merger consideration. In other 
words, there is very little evidence that fiduciary suits are associated with merit.  
V. DO THE MERITS MATTER IN APPRAISAL LITIGATION?
The results presented above already suggest that in the merger context, the 
merits are not the principal driver of fiduciary duty litigation, if they matter at 
all. By comparing the analysis above with a similar analysis for appraisal 
litigation involving the same universe of transactions, however, we strengthen 
the result in two ways. First, we provide a vivid contrast, enabling us to see the 
extent to which the pattern of fiduciary duty litigation departs from the pattern 
that prevails in merit-driven litigation. Second, we begin to narrow down the 
potential causes for the dysfunction prevailing in shareholder litigation. If, 
despite their structural differences, patterns of litigation were similar for 
fiduciary duty claims and appraisal, we might be forced to conclude that the 
irrelevance of the merits in shareholder litigation is simply an unavoidable 
phenomenon and no different than in any other type of litigation. Because, as 
                                                                                                                       
229 The p-value in a two-sided t-test is 0.65. 
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we show, the patterns of litigation are in fact starkly different, we infer that the 
particular structural features of shareholder litigation are to blame for its 
peculiarly vexatious character.  
A. Descriptive Statistics for Appraisal 
We perform the same battery of statistical tests on appraisal litigation that 
we performed on fiduciary duty litigation. But before doing so, it is worth 
examining the practice of appraisal litigation descriptively in order to validate 
our hypothesis that appraisal claims should tend to be meritorious.230 We 
collected all appraisal petitions filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery since 
that court moved to electronic dockets in 2003. We identified 139 appraisal 
petitions involving transactions between 2004 and 2013 where the target was a 
publicly-traded company. These petitions targeted 108 separate transactions. Of 
these, only ninety-five target companies appear in our data on 1,168 appraisal-
eligible merger transactions during the same period. One of these transactions 
involved a dispute only over preferred stock, leaving ninety-four appraisal 
disputes involving public company common stock.  
On the incidence of appraisal, the common scholarly perception is that 
stockholders rarely invoke the remedy.231 The raw numbers offer some support 
to this view, in that the frequency of appraisal petitions is substantially less than 
that of fiduciary duty class actions. Only 8% of eligible transactions between 
                                                                                                                       
230 In addition to providing this robustness check for our intuitions, simply providing a 
fuller perspective on appraisal activity is itself valuable, as the literature betrays a dearth of 
information on the overall incidence of appraisal litigation. Indeed, there is very little 
existing empirical work on appraisal litigation. Randall Thomas collected 266 appraisal 
actions filed in Delaware from 1977 to 1997. Thomas, supra note 195, at 22. Thomas 
presented figures on the duration of the proceedings, the number of motions the parties filed, 
and the number of judicial hearings, but did not attempt to assess the merits or outcomes of 
the claims. Id. at 22–23 (reporting an average duration of 727 days and that in all 266 cases 
there were 572 motions filed and 84 judicial hearings). Feng Chen, Kenton K. Yee, and 
Yong Keun Yoo claim to have gathered a list of all opinions in appraisal actions published in 
the Lexis-Nexis database over the past several decades. See Feng Chen et al., Robustness of 
Judicial Decisions to Valuation-Method Innovation: An Exploratory Empirical Study, 37 J.
BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1094, 1096 (2010). Because the bulk of claims are settled without 
generating an opinion, however, their study paints only a highly incomplete picture of 
appraisal litigation as a whole. See id. Furthermore, a substantial portion of the cases they 
examine are not actually statutory appraisal actions; many are other forms of shareholder 
litigation that happened to require the court to calculate the fair value of the plaintiffs’ 
shares. See id.
231 See supra note 182. In an unpublished work, Randall Thomas cataloged appraisal 
petitions in the Delaware Court of Chancery through 2005, noting variation from a baseline 
of “relatively few” filings. See PowerPoint Presentation by Randall S. Thomas, Vanderbilt 
Law School, Do We Need to Fix the Delaware Appraisal Statute? (on file with authors). 
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2004 and 2013 attracted at least one appraisal petition. In absolute terms, 
however, the number of appraisal actions is hardly trivial.232
Another threshold issue is the size of the petitioners’ holdings. If the merits 
matter in appraisal, we would expect petitioners to possess substantial holdings 
such that the prospective recovery at trial justifies the expense of litigation. 
Conversely, if appraisal petitions are brought by plaintiffs’ attorneys without 
regard for the merits, largely in order to extract a nuisance settlement, we would 
expect petitioners to resemble the named plaintiffs in other forms of shareholder 
litigation, who often own only a handful of shares. After all, it costs the same 
amount to defend an appraisal claim regardless of how many shares the 
petitioner owns.233
Dissenters had substantial holdings in the target company stock. In order to 
pursue an appraisal action, the petitioner must turn down the option of receiving 
the merger consideration. The consideration the petitioner would have received 
in the merger thus can serve as a rough measure of the size of the petitioner’s 
potential claim. We measure the holdings in two ways—in 2013 dollars and as a 
percentage of the total equity of the target company—and we can determine 
these amounts for the dissenting group in eighty-five of the public company 
mergers with counseled appraisal petitions.234 While not ideal measures of the 
expected value of the petitioners’ claims, these numbers reveal that the majority 
of petitioners have a sizeable economic interest in the litigation. The largest 
dissenting group had $654 million in target company stock as of the merger date 
and the smallest held $2,262. The mean petitioner group had holdings of $36.6 
million, and the median was $1.8 million. In percentage terms, the smallest 
challenge was by stockholders owning 0.000127% of the equity value, and the 
largest was 31.3%. The mean was 3.2% and the median was 0.96%. Thus, the 
median appraisal group represents fairly substantial stockholdings, as opposed 
to being a professional plaintiff owning a handful of shares. Approximately 
86% of our sample has a greater economic stake than what now-Vice 
Chancellor Laster has suggested as a threshold beyond which an appraisal 
action is potentially worth filing.235 With such large amounts at stake, the value 
of the claim itself should exceed the litigation cost in the majority of cases. 
A unique feature of appraisal is that a surprising number of petitions are 
filed pro se, without the assistance of an attorney. Nine of the 139 appraisal 
                                                                                                                       
232 In addition, our data show a sharp increase in appraisal activity after 2011. We 
discuss this phenomenon in our companion paper. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 18 
(manuscript at 14). Nothing in the “new era” of appraisal alters the results or interpretation 
presented here. 
233 See infra Part V.B. 
234 In most cases, there was only one petitioner. In cases with more than one petitioner 
regarding the same transaction, however, we summed the shares held by all of the 
petitioners. 
235 See J. Travis Laster, The Appraisal Remedy in Third Party Deals, 18 INSIGHTS 4
(Apr. 2004) (suggesting a $500,000 threshold). Adjusted to 2013 dollars, that figure is 
$620,000. 
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petitions—or 6.5%—were brought pro se. This is in contrast to other forms of 
shareholder litigation, which are almost never brought pro se. In one database 
of over 600 derivative suits over options backdating, for example, there is only 
one pro se case.236 Whatever demons may drive pro se litigation, we can be 
confident that agency costs are not among them. Pro se litigants, acting on their 
own behalf and bearing their own expenses, must believe that the game is worth 
the candle, even if that belief is not always reasonable.237 In fact, even the pro
se litigants in our sample often have a considerable amount at stake. For public 
company targets, such pro se plaintiffs owned a mean value of $525,000 with a 
median of $28,935. While these amounts are, unsurprisingly, significantly 
smaller than those at stake for counseled petitioners,238 they are large enough to 
suggest that real value is at stake even in many pro se petitions.  
The infrequency with which most forms of shareholder litigation go to trial 
and the almost complete absence of cases where the plaintiffs prevail on the 
merits are often cited as evidence of a lack of merit.239 While a large majority of 
appraisal cases in our dataset also ended in settlement, the rate of trial is far 
higher than in other forms of shareholder litigation. Approximately 75% of the 
disputes have been resolved, and of these approximately 80% of the resolved 
cases were settled. Nine cases—nearly 10% of the overall disputes—were tried 
to judgment.240 We cannot observe the settlement amounts in most 
circumstances because the parties do not make the terms of the settlement 
public. The trial outcomes, however, are observable, and while they suggest that 
appraisal petitioners face a considerable amount of risk in their claims,241 they 
also reveal a respectable track record of success on the merits. Of the nine trial 
outcomes, the median award was a 19.5% premium over the merger 
                                                                                                                       
236 See generally Quinn Curtis & Minor Myers, Do the Merits Matter? Evidence from 
Options Backdating Derivative Litigation (Sept. 1, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with authors). The relatively high incidence of pro se litigation suggests, first, that 
characterizations of appraisal actions as procedurally Byzantine are off the mark. Mahoney 
and Weinstein, for example, argue that “it is unlikely that an average shareholder would 
successfully negotiate the procedural steps required to be entitled to [appraisal] without the 
advice of a lawyer.” Mahoney & Weinstein, supra note 16, at 244. Our findings suggest that, 
if anything, the procedural aspects of an appraisal proceeding may be more straightforward 
than those associated with derivative litigation.  
237 While it is possible that a pro se plaintiff may bring a claim in an attempt to extract a 
nuisance settlement, we see no evidence of serial pro se litigants or other indications of 
abusive litigation. The profile of a pro se appraisal petitioner appears to be simply a 
disgruntled shareholder who does not want to pay an attorney. 
238 A two-sample t-test in log dollars shows the difference in merger consideration for 
counseled versus pro se plaintiffs is statistically significant at the p = 0.001 level. 
239 See Romano, supra note 1, at 60–61. 
240 Of the remainder, some petitions were withdrawn, others were dismissed without 
prejudice, and some were dismissed for failure to prosecute. Not surprisingly, cases 
involving larger dollar amounts tend to go to trial more often than cases involving smaller 
dollar amounts.  
241 One trial awarded dissenters 19.5% below the merger price, and another trial 
determined that the dissenters’ holdings were completely worthless. 
882 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:5 
consideration. This success at trial stands in sharp contrast to other forms of 
shareholder litigation and indicates that appraisal claims that go to trial, at the 
very least, frequently have merit. 
These descriptive statistics show that appraisal actions bear few of the 
hallmarks of the agency costs that bedevil other forms of shareholder litigation. 
They also provide some assurance that we are justified in using the 
characteristics of transactions selected for appraisal litigation as a benchmark 
for evaluating the merits of fiduciary duty class actions. 
B. The Unimportance of Transaction Size in Appraisal 
To examine the effect of deal size on the likelihood of appraisal, we used 
the same two measures of the value of the transaction that we used for fiduciary 
duty class actions: enterprise value and equity value.242 Again, both are 
calculated in constant 2013 dollars. Table 4 reports the mean and median sizes 
of both measures of transaction size across various categories of transactions.  
Table 4: Comparison of Transaction Size in Appraisal Cases, 
in Millions of 2013 Dollars
 Equity Value Enterprise Value 
Mean Median Mean Median 
No Appraisal $1,912 $458 $2,686 $481 
All Appraisal 2,909 465 3,007 536 
Pro Se Appraisal 21,042 1,333 20,945 1,292 
Counseled 
Appraisal 1,450 433 1,564 490 
Transactions attracting appraisal are slightly larger, on both measures of 
size, than transactions not attracting appraisal.243 When we consider only those 
appraisal actions filed by plaintiffs represented by counsel, however, the 
difference in deal size disappears. Indeed, transactions attracting counseled 
appraisal actions are actually smaller than the deals that did not generate a 
counseled appraisal action. It is only pro se plaintiffs who disproportionately 
target the largest deals.244 Whatever is driving pro se plaintiffs to target large 
deals, we can be certain that it is not agency costs. 
                                                                                                                       
242 It could be argued that the size of the acquirer would be a more appropriate metric, 
as it is the acquirer who will pay any judgment or settlement and thus would represent the 
potential “deep pocket.” For reasons discussed below, it is neither possible nor necessary to 
examine acquirer size. 
243 None of the differences in transaction size (measured in raw or log dollars) between 
transactions attracting appraisal and those that do not is significant at any conventional level.  
244 Across both measures of size and also when looking at log dollars, the difference in 
transaction size between transactions with counseled petitions and pro se petitions is 
significant at least at the 5% level. 
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For counseled petitions, the difference in transaction size between deals that 
attracted appraisal petitions and those that did not is not statistically significant, 
whether measured in constant dollars or in the logarithm of constant dollars. 
This lack of a strong relationship between transaction size and counseled 
appraisal can be seen visually. Figure 3 shows a kernel density plot of 
transactions that attracted counseled appraisal petitions in gray and those 
transactions that did not in black.  
Figure 3: Density Plot of Transactions Attracting Counseled Appraisal 
Petition (Gray), by the Logarithm of Equity Size 
Figure 3 illustrates that those transactions that attracted counseled appraisal 
petitions differ only slightly, if at all, in equity value from those that did not. A 
plot using enterprise value rather than equity value looks similar.  
A potential criticism of our analysis here is that we are not comparing 
apples to apples when we look at the size of the transaction for both fiduciary 
duty class actions and for appraisal actions. After all, while in a fiduciary duty 
class action it is the target company’s officers and directors being sued, in an 
appraisal action any resulting damage award is a liability of the acquiring
company. If appraisal petitioners are seeking deep pockets for nuisance claims, 
then, we might want to look at the size of the acquirer instead of the size of the 
target.  
We are not able to construct any reliable tests that get at whether acquirer 
size matters. More than half of the acquirers in our sample (617 out of 1,168) 
are not publicly traded. These include foreign firms, private companies, and 
investment vehicles like private equity funds, for which we have no reliable 
information on their size. For the limited universe of transactions where we 
have information on the acquirer’s market value, we find no statistically 
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significant difference between transactions attracting appraisal and those that do 
not.245
Moreover, there are strong reasons to suspect that the set of transactions 
with public acquirers is not representative of the larger universe of appraisal-
eligible transactions. Many, if not most, acquisitions with a publicly traded 
acquirer involve substantial synergies—one competitor buying another, for 
example—and synergies are excluded from the calculation of the value of an 
appraisal petitioner’s shares.246 This increases the possibility that the court will 
find fair value—net of synergies—to be below the merger price. By contrast, 
many non-publicly traded acquirers are financial buyers, where synergistic 
gains are likely to be small or non-existent. Looking only at deals with publicly-
traded buyers would thus involve a skewed sample where the risks of appraisal 
are likely to be abnormally high.  
Relying on transaction size is unlikely to be a particularly serious problem. 
Deal size is not a perfect proxy for deep pockets in an appraisal case, but it is at 
least correlated to the size of the acquirer. While a large firm can buy a small 
firm, a small firm generally cannot—absent unusual circumstances—buy a 
large firm. As a result, mergers involving larger targets, on average, should 
involve larger acquirers. Our data confirm this. In a regression where our 
dependent variable was the log size of the target and the only independent 
variable was the log size of the acquirer, the coefficient on target size is positive 
and significant beyond the 1% level. Given this strong correlation, the use of 
target size cannot explain the lack of any significant relationship between deep 
pockets and the incidence of appraisal litigation. 
C. The Importance of the Merger Premium 
As has been noted, the only issue in an appraisal action is the fair value of 
the plaintiffs’ shares, and the sole remedy is very straightforward—cash in 
exchange for the shares. Whatever its advantages or disadvantages to 
shareholders, this simplicity offers a comparatively clean opportunity to assess 
the merits of a claim.  
                                                                                                                       
245 The mean size of acquirers in the thirty-one transactions attracting an appraisal 
petition was $29.8 billion, while the mean acquirer size in the 579 transactions with no 
appraisal petition was $49.8 billion. The difference (in raw dollars or log dollars), as noted, 
is not statistically significant.  
246 See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 74 (Del. Ch. 2013) (noting 
that in appraisal, valuations must “back out any synergies”); Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., No. 
5233-VCP, 2012 WL 1569818, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012) (“Determining the value of a 
‘going concern’ requires the [c]ourt to exclude any synergistic value . . . .”); Union Ill. 1995 
Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“[T]his court 
must endeavor to exclude from any appraisal award the amount of any value that the selling 
company’s shareholders would receive because a buyer intends to operate the subject 
company, not as a stand-alone going concern, but as a part of a larger enterprise, from which 
synergistic gains can be extracted.”). 
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We rely on similar measures of residual deal premium to those described 
above in analyzing fiduciary duty class actions. The only difference here is that 
we use the residual from the final merger premium because this is the amount 
relevant to an appraisal petitioner who decides to file a petition only after the 
transaction has closed. We were able to determine these figures for eighty-nine 
deals that attracted appraisal actions—six pro se and eighty-three counseled—
and 1,009 deals that did not. We find that for all three measures, the deals that 
attracted appraisal actions have lower residual premia, as shown in Table 5.  
Table 5: Comparison of Merger Premia Residuals in Appraisal Cases 
 1-Day Premium 1-Week Premium 4-Week Premium 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
No
Appraisal 2.2% -3.2% 2.9% -2.9% 2.9% -2.9% 
All 
Appraisal -15.5 -16.1 -16.3 -13.2 -19.1 -20.7 
Pro Se
Appraisal -9.5 -2.0 -11.9 0.3 -12.1 -3.0 
Counseled 
Appraisal -15.9 -16.2 -16.6 -14.5 -19.6 -21.3 
The appraisal petitions target deals with highly negative residual premia 
residuals, and the differences between appraisal and non-appraisal transactions 
are all statistically significant beyond the 1% level in a two-sided t-test. Again, 
this demonstrates that appraisal petitioners target deals where the deal premium 
is significantly lower than would be expected based on the characteristics of the 
target company. Figure 4 below is a kernel density plot showing the likelihood 
of attracting counseled appraisal petitions by one-week residual premium, 
which illustrates the difference. 
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Figure 4: Transaction Premia Residuals for Transactions with Counseled 
Appraisal (Gray), By One-Week Residual Premia 
The gray line shows the kernel density plot of the incidence of counseled 
appraisal petitions by residual transaction premium, while the black line shows 
the same for transactions not attracting counseled petitions. The plots for the 
one-day and four-week premia look substantially similar. The consistent pattern 
across the three measures is that appraisal litigation involves transactions with 
strongly negative residual premia.  
As hypothesized, appraisal petitioners thus appear to target transactions 
with lower merger premia. While we lack an exogenous shock that would allow 
us to draw more firm causal inferences, the result certainly suggests that the 
appraisal petitions are brought with due regard to the merits.  
D. Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Appraisal Proceedings 
As with fiduciary duty class actions, we use regression to examine more 
searchingly the determinants of appraisal proceedings. Our first approach is to 
construct logistic regression models, identifying the factors that predict whether 
or not a transaction will face an appraisal petition. In these models, our 
dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the transaction 
faced a counselled appraisal petition and zero otherwise. Our transaction dataset 
again includes ninety-four transactions that attracted at least one appraisal 
petition involving common stock, eighty-seven of which were counseled. We 
use the same independent variables as before: the log of transaction value, the 
residual premium, and variables for going private transactions and financial 
buyers.  
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Our results appear in Panel E in the Appendix. Under all specifications, our 
measures of deal premium residual are strongly significant, and the sign of the 
coefficient is always negative, meaning that appraisal petitioners are more likely 
to target deals with lower merger premia. In addition, the going private variable 
is positive and strongly significant in all specifications, suggesting appraisal 
petitioners target going private transactions, where conflicts of interest are most 
likely to be acute.  
As we did with the fiduciary suits, we can estimate the effects of these 
variables on the incidence of appraisal litigation. A one standard deviation 
decrease in the one-week residual premium implies an increase of between 
3.7% and 9.1% in the predicted probability of an appraisal petition. Similarly, a 
going-private transaction implies an increase in the likelihood of a petition 
between 2.1% and 14.0%.247 All of the other variables—including, notably, 
transaction size—have no impact on the likelihood of an appraisal petition that 
is statistically distinguishable from zero.  
                                                                                                                       
247 These numbers are in relation to a much smaller baseline incidence of appraisal 
litigation (only approximately 8%, versus 60% for fiduciary class action). See supra Part IV. 
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Our second empirical approach is again similar to our fiduciary duty 
analysis. Instead of treating appraisal as a binary yes-or-no question, we looked 
beyond the mere incidence of appraisal to see how many shares actually sought 
appraisal. Here we computed the percentage of equity value that sought 
appraisal in each transaction, rounding to the nearest percentage integer. Of the 
1,168 appraisal eligible transactions, fifty-seven had 1% or more of 
shareholders seek appraisal.248 We used these numbers as our dependent 
variables for a Poisson regression, using the same independent variables noted 
above.  
The results of this regression appear in Panel F of the Appendix. As in our 
logistic regressions, the sign of the coefficient here for premium is negative 
under all specifications, and in each case it is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Transaction size has a consistently positive sign but only equity size is 
significant and only under some specifications. Both the going-private dummy 
variable and the financial buyer dummy variable are significant in all 
specifications. In Model 2,249 the marginal effect at the mean for a one standard 
deviation change in the log of equity size is an additional 0.03% of equity value 
seeking appraisal.250 The estimated effect for a one standard deviation decrease 
                                                                                                                       
248 The firms in each transaction that sought appraisal are shown in the following table: 
Percentage of Shareholders Seeking Appraisal,  
by Transactions 
Percentage of Shareholders 
Seeking Appraisal (Rounded 
to Nearest Integer)
Firms 
0 1,111 
1 20 
2 6 
3 7 
4 4
5 6
6 2 
7 1 
8 3 
9 1 
11 1
12 1
15 1 
17 1 
19 1 
21 1 
31 1
Total 1,168
249 We use Model 2 here instead of Model 3, as we do above, because in Model 2 equity 
value is statistically significant.  
250 The 95% confidence interval is 0.011% to 0.051%.  
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in the residual premium is much larger: 0.17%.251 For going-private, the effect 
is even larger, an increase of 0.21% of equity value seeking appraisal; the effect 
for financial buyer is 0.13%.252
In sum, not only was an appraisal petition more likely to be filed the lower 
the residual premium, but the percentage of shares seeking appraisal also tended 
to go up as the residual premium decreased. By contrast, the incidence of 
appraisal was not predicted by the size of the transaction, and its intensity was 
only slightly related to size. Taken together, these results for appraisal litigation 
cast the corresponding results for fiduciary duty class actions—where deal size 
matters a great deal and merger premium matters little or not at all—in a 
particularly unflattering light. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LITIGATION
Our results are strong evidence that the operation of fiduciary class actions 
is broken. While a full program of reform is well beyond the scope of this 
Article, we hazard here a few thoughts on the future of representative 
shareholder litigation. In short, we argue that altering the structure of 
shareholder litigation could help to ensure that it functions as a useful tool of 
corporate governance in the future.  
A. Limiting or Abolishing Shareholder Suits 
Given our findings that the merits matter little in traditional merger 
litigation, the most straightforward conclusion that could be drawn is that this 
type of merger litigation should be sharply limited or abolished altogether. 
Indeed, even without the compelling evidence we present as to lack of merit, the 
increasing frequency of fiduciary class actions challenging mergers of any 
significant size has already attracted harsh criticism. Robert M. Daines and Olga 
Koumrian, for example, have noted as follows: “The cost of these suits is pretty 
clear. Companies typically agree to pay plaintiffs’ lawyer fees (about $1.2 
million on average in the last two years) and must usually cover their own legal 
costs. What is less clear is how shareholders are benefiting from litigation.”253
They argue that some type of federal reform is necessary in order “to tame the 
recent upswing in deal litigation.”254
Similarly, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform has 
condemned merger class actions in categorical terms: “This is extortion through 
                                                                                                                       
251 The 95% confidence interval is 0.14% and 0.20%. 
252 The 95% confidence interval is 0.13% to 0.31% for a going-private transaction and 
0.07% to 0.18% for financial buyer. 
253 Robert M. Daines & Olga Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits Yield High Costs and 
Questionable Benefits, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 8, 2012, 10:38 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/merger-lawsuits-yield-high-costs-and-questionable-
benefits/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/RC6T-57Z3.  
254 Id. 
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litigation, plain and simple. Trial lawyers hold transactions hostage until they 
collect a ‘litigation tax,’ draining a share of the merger’s economic benefit away 
from shareholders and into the lawyers’ own pockets.”255 They too have called 
for substantial action at the federal level to curtail merger class actions.256 Other 
commentators go even further. For instance, Stephen M. Bainbridge argues to 
the extent that shareholder litigation fails to deter wrongdoing—and its 
indifference to the merits makes it hard to imagine how it could provide much 
deterrence—there is no case to be made for its existence, and it ought to be 
abolished.257
While we agree that the failings of conventional shareholder litigation are 
quite plain, we believe that a blunderbuss approach to reforming shareholder 
suits (or eliminating them altogether) is actually unnecessary. At the same time 
as our results provide the most compelling evidence yet that shareholder 
litigation is largely unmoored from the merits, they also provide reason for 
optimism about the prospects for reform. In particular, our contrasting results 
for appraisal litigation demonstrate that the meritless nature of merger class 
actions stems from the particular features of shareholder litigation rather than 
from a more universal and unavoidable risk of nuisance litigation.  
A number of structural features of fiduciary class actions potentially 
contribute to the problem. We consider the following five features to be the 
most problematic: (i) insurance policies that cover settlements but not damages 
following trial; (ii) the ability of plaintiffs’ attorneys to secure fees in the 
absence of monetary recovery; (iii) disproportionate discovery costs faced by 
defendants; (iv) asymmetric litigation risk; and (v) the agency problem and lack 
of effective monitoring of plaintiffs’ attorneys, which opens the door for 
litigation that is not in shareholders’ interest. As we explain below, with 
appropriate reforms targeting these structural problems, the shareholder suit 
could be transformed into a potent tool for deterring misbehavior.  
B. Reforming Shareholder Suits 
Ironically, the structure of appraisal—a form of litigation that has long been 
derided as a misguided anachronism—may be a source of ideas for beneficial 
reform. Appraisal, in fact, supplies the central insight that guides our reforms: 
                                                                                                                       
255 ANDREW J. PINCUS, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE TRIAL LAWYERS’
NEW MERGER TAX: CORPORATE MERGERS AND THE MEGA MILLION-DOLLAR LITIGATION 
TOLL ON OUR ECONOMY 1 (2012), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/ 
uploads/sites/1/M_and_A.pdf.  
256 Id. at 10 (“Action is needed now to eliminate the abusive litigation that is hurting 
shareholders, and forcing corporations to spend millions of dollars on a litigation tax rather 
than on building their businesses, creating new jobs, and expanding our economy.”).  
257 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 404 (2002) (making 
a case for “eliminating derivative litigation”); see also BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 37, at 
20 (“[I]f shareholder litigation does not deter, then it loses its core justification and ought, 
therefore, to be abolished.”). 
2014] THE STRUCTURE OF STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION 891 
that the merits matter when controlled by plaintiffs with a genuine stake in the 
proceedings, who gain if the claims succeed and suffer if they fail. We outline 
the broad strokes of some reform ideas that emerge from this thinking.  
Litigation activity is, of course, the product of a wide array of legal rules, 
establishing a complex framework of incentives. Reforms across various fields 
thus hold out the hope of improvement. For example, reforms to D&O 
insurance may be justified to limit the ability of insurers to cover settlement 
payments but not recovery at trial.258 Arguably, such reforms should come from 
the insurance industry itself, but to the extent that the costs of meritless 
litigation constitute externalities, there is potentially a case for public 
regulation.  
Similarly, additional scrutiny of fees awarded to plaintiffs’ attorneys is 
appropriate to ensure some relationship between fees awarded and actual 
benefit to the plaintiffs. In the merger context, a strong presumption should 
exist that the only meaningful benefit to plaintiffs would be an increase in the 
merger consideration.259 In particular, Delaware courts should be far more 
hesitant to approve an award of substantial attorneys’ fees in a settlement 
providing only additional disclosure unless there is some reason to believe the 
additional disclosure has led to a higher price.260 The courts might presume that 
the appropriate award of attorneys’ fees in fiduciary class actions is some fixed 
percentage of the monetary benefit to the shareholders and nothing more. 
Reforms designed to reduce—or require sharing of—the costs of discovery 
could also be fruitful. Taken together, these reforms would radically reduce the 
incentive to mount a fiduciary challenge to transactions that do not merit 
challenge.  
The focus of our proposed reforms, however, centers on two ideas: (i) that 
Delaware courts reverse course and privilege stockholders who acquire their 
stock after the announcement of a merger and (ii) that Delaware shift to an opt-
in regime for merger claims.  
Appraisal petitioners have large holdings that are often acquired after the 
announcement of the transaction for the purpose of pursuing the appraisal 
                                                                                                                       
258 See generally BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 37, at 128 51. 
259 See supra Part IV.D. 
260 Former Chancellor Strine recently emphasized the anomalous nature of awarding 
attorneys’ fees for a disclosure-only settlement:  
[I]t’s an odd thing about this job that you can award a lot of money to someone for a 
case and award money to an attorney when, in other contexts of the law—no medical 
malpractice plaintiff’s lawyer walks out of cases with money in her pocket and turns on 
the client and says, “Well, remember, you’ve got that explanation about why the doctor 
made his choice in the operating room, and I know you feel a lot better. You don’t have 
any money, but you know why the doctor made the choice he made with the scalpel, 
and I’ve got a couple hundred thousand dollars.” 
Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and the 
Court’s Ruling at 30, In re Danvers Bankcorp, Inc. S’holders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 6162-
CS (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2011).  
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claim.261 Plaintiffs in public-company merger claims, by contrast, do not. For 
purposes of bringing a fiduciary suit, the standing requirements pose severe 
limitations. To bring a derivative fiduciary claim in Delaware, Section 327 of 
the Delaware code requires that a plaintiff be an owner at the time of the alleged 
wrongdoing.262 This requirement of contemporaneous ownership means that 
those who acquire stock after that time have no power to enforce the claims. 
One influential treatise summarizes the policy behind the rule as follows: “The 
purpose of section 327 is to eliminate abuses associated with derivative suits, 
and in particular to prevent the purchasing of shares in order to maintain a 
derivative action attacking a transaction that occurred prior to the purchase.”263
Merger class actions are direct, not derivative, claims, but the 
contemporaneous ownership is also at work there too, albeit with a peculiar 
wrinkle. While the question of whether after-acquiring stockholders can be 
members of the class has never been squarely addressed, the Delaware courts 
have held that, due to uncertainty surrounding the question, stockholders who 
acquired stock only after the announcement of the transaction cannot serve as 
lead plaintiff.264 As the Chancery Court has recognized, the basis of the 
fiduciary allegation is the board’s agreement to unfavorable “terms of the 
merger, rather than the technicality of its consummation.”265 For this reason, the 
Chancery Court held in Dieter v. Prime Computer, Inc. that an after-acquiring 
stockholder was disqualified from serving as class representative.266 The settled 
understanding seems to be that after-acquired investors are unwelcome in 
fiduciary class actions.267
                                                                                                                       
261 For more on appraisal claims, see our companion paper, Korsmo & Myers, supra 
note 18 (manuscript at 19). 
262 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2014) (requiring that a derivative stockholder allege 
that it held the stock “at the time of the transaction of which such stockholder complains”).  
263 WELCH ET AL., supra note 263, § 327.3. 
264 See Dieter v. Prime Computer, Inc., 681 A.2d 1068, 1072–73 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
265 In re Beatrice Cos., Inc. Litig., 522 A.2d 865 (Del. 1987); see also Dieter, 681 A.2d 
at 1072 (“It is not the [m]erger that constitutes the wrongful act of which [p]laintiffs 
complain; it is the fixing of the terms of the transaction.” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citation omitted))).  
266 Dieter, 681 A.2d at 1072–73.  
267 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 140, § 13.25 (Supp. 2014) (citing Leighton v. 
Lewis, 577 A.2d 753 (Del. 1990)) (“[A] stockholder who purchases shares of stock after the 
announcement of the challenged merger should not be permitted to maintain a class action 
challenging the merger since he is not truly a member of the class.”). Although precluded 
from service as lead plaintiff, after-acquiring stockholders are nevertheless often eligible to 
receive any benefits of the class action settlement because settlement classes are commonly 
defined to include transferees. See In re Prodigy Commc’ns Corp. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. 
A. 19113, 2002 WL 1767543, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2002) (citing In re Triarc Cos., Inc., 
Class and Derivative Litig., 791 A.2d 872, 878–79 (Del. Ch. 2001)) (“[W]hen a claim is 
asserted on behalf of a class of stockholders challenging the fairness of the terms of a 
proposed transaction under Delaware law, the class will ordinarily consist of those persons 
who held shares as of the date the transaction was announced and their transferees, 
successors and assigns.”). Due to the extreme rarity of monetary recovery, however, 
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The policy behind the contemporaneous ownership requirement, however, 
gets things precisely backwards.268 Our appraisal results are compelling 
evidence that one source of the dysfunction in fiduciary class actions is this 
limitation on who can bring claims. Stockholders who acquire their stock after 
the announcement of the merger can pursue appraisal claims,269 and indeed they 
have considerable time to evaluate the merits of the appraisal claim before they 
must invest.270 By contrast, the only investors who are in a position to enforce 
the board’s fiduciary duties are those are those who happened to own target 
stock on the day of the merger announcement—and who presumably invested in 
the stock for reasons orthogonal to the enforcement of fiduciary duties. By 
freezing the universe of potential plaintiffs at the time of the transaction 
announcement, the contemporaneous ownership requirement keeps out new 
investors possessing expertise at identifying and prosecuting claims for breach 
of fiduciary duty. The scarcity of suitable lead plaintiffs is thus an artificial 
scarcity. To be sure, an existing investor could hire an expert attorney to help 
prosecute an action. But attorney control of the claims is often at the very root 
of the problems with shareholder litigation. An investor choosing to buy into a 
fiduciary claim should signal to the court and to the defendants that the investor 
believes the case to have merit and is willing to dedicate significant time and 
treasure into pursuing the claim.  
The ironic result is that a policy purportedly instituted to avoid strike suits 
may, in fact, be blocking pursuit of meritorious claims while doing little to 
prevent strike suits. A beneficial reform to the procedures used to select lead 
counsel in Delaware, therefore, would be to give priority to investors by the 
amount of stock they acquire after the announcement of the merger.271
                                                                                                                       
inclusion in the recovery class without an ability to influence the litigation is of limited 
practical utility. 
268 We are neither the first commentators nor the most influential to criticize the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement. See, e.g., J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the 
Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 673 (2008) (arguing 
that the rule is “fundamentally incoherent,” that it “operates largely at random,” and that “it 
arbitrarily mandates the dismissal of potentially meritorious claims”); Macey & Miller, 
supra note 41, at 77 (“The rationale for the contemporaneous ownership rule . . . appears 
questionable at best.”). 
269 In another paper, we present evidence that this phenomenon is becoming 
increasingly common in appraisal, leading to the rise of what we call “appraisal arbitrage.” 
See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 18 (manuscript at 1). 
270 In a tender offer, an investor can acquire appraisal rights by purchasing right up until 
the expiration of the offer. In a transaction where shareholders will vote, stockholders who 
invest before the vote can seek appraisal. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 
346, 368 (Del. Ch. 2008) (holding that the record date is not the cutoff for standing to seek 
appraisal).  
271 Unlike the federal PSLRA standard, Delaware does not adhere to a strict ranking by 
value of holdings in selecting a leadership structure. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
990 A.2d 940, 955 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[T]he weight given to the size of a plaintiffs’ holding is 
not used to generate a formalistic ranking, but rather comes into play when a plaintiff owns a 
894 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:5 
If the only reform Delaware were to undertake is to abandon the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement, investors might acquire stock not to 
pursue meritorious fiduciary claims but to win the prize position of speaking on 
behalf of a large shareholder class. They could then exploit that class to spread 
litigation costs and extort an in terrorem settlement. Additional reforms, 
however, could help ensure that investors refrain from bringing actions that 
shareholders do not want and settling them on terms they would not approve. 
Again appraisal can serve as a model. Appraisal petitioners must opt-in to the 
claim by taking several steps to preserve their appraisal rights. The only 
aggregation of claims in appraisal is via a would-be petitioner accumulating 
additional shares or by multiple petitioners affirmatively opting in.  
Drawing on the appraisal example, fiduciary litigation might abandon the 
class action model and insist that claims can be prosecuted only on behalf of 
those who affirmatively seek to prosecute them. As a result, no shareholder 
would have the ability to hold up a transaction with the threat of a catastrophic 
class action. The downside of this reform, of course, is that it would effectively 
strip many small stockholders of their ability to pursue fiduciary claims. This 
downside, however, is more symbolic than real. As things currently stand, there 
is little evidence to suggest that minority shareholders—indeed, any 
shareholders—obtain any material benefits from the operation of merger class 
actions. Thus, switching to an opt-in regime would not strip minority 
shareholders of anything they do not already lack. On the contrary, any loss 
would be more than offset by the benefits associated with an enforcement 
regime that had some genuine deterrent power.  
By privileging after-acquired shares and moving to an opt-in regime, the 
fiduciary enforcement regime would allow arbitrageurs to purchase shares 
following a merger announcement with the intention of prosecuting a claim. By 
amassing a large position, these arbitrageurs could solve the collective action 
problems that would otherwise plague shareholder litigation without creating an 
agency problem in their stead. And they would have no power to bring nuisance 
claims based on nothing more than the size of the shareholder class. We would 
expect reforms along these lines to lead to a dramatic redeployment of litigation 
resources. Under the current rules, almost every transaction attracts a small 
volley of claims, but none proceed to trial. We predict that our rules would 
result in far fewer transactions facing any fiduciary litigation, while those that 
do attract claims would involve more intense litigation activity, including more 
trials. These proposals raise a host of complex practical and policy issues that 
are beyond the scope of this Article, but the present woeful state of merger 
litigation warrants consideration of such ambitious reforms. 
                                                                                                                       
sufficient stake to provide an economic incentive to monitor counsel and play a meaningful 
role in conducting the case.”).  
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VII. CONCLUSION
This Article presents new and compelling evidence to supply an answer to 
one of the most fundamental and long-running debates in corporate and 
securities law: Do the merits matter in shareholder litigation? For decades, 
resolution of this debate has been hampered by the difficulty of defining and 
assessing the “merits” of shareholder claims. We provide a novel solution to 
this problem by exploiting the differences between the two types of legal claims 
available to shareholders who object to a merger—a state-law fiduciary duty 
class action and a shareholder appraisal action seeking judicial valuation of their 
shares. Both types of claims seek to remedy the same wrong—a merger price 
that is too low—but appraisal claims are structured such that they are unlikely 
to share the pathologies of other forms of shareholder litigation. 
Our results reveal that in fiduciary duty class actions targeting mergers, the 
decision to bring a claim is driven largely by the pursuit of deep pockets, with 
only slight regard for the adequacy of the merger price. By contrast, in a 
corresponding sample of appraisal actions, we find that petitioners target 
mergers with unusually low merger prices, rather than simply targeting large 
deals. In addition to providing the strongest evidence yet that the merits do not 
matter in most shareholder litigation, our findings imply that many of the well-
known pathologies of shareholder litigation are driven by the structure of the 
class and the resulting agency problems. We argue that these results suggest that 
the appraisal remedy—routinely dismissed by most corporate law scholars—
could serve as a model to reduce meritless claims in representative shareholder 
litigation.  
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